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britanskimi, bolj tolerantni do priseljencev. To nas pripelje do z
 
kraljestvo. 
A comparative analysis of immigration-related threat perception in the United Kingdom 
and Germany as civic and ethnic national identity states 
The thesis has examined people s attitudes towards immigration, aiming to relate them to the 
civic or ethnic national identity of their state; with particular focus on the cases of the UK and 
Germany, respectively. The starting point of the analysis was the probability of correlation 
between the two variables, namely the perceived threats towards immigrants were expected to 
correlate to the civic and ethnic national identity. Civic national identity was supposed to be 
linked with positive immigration threat perception and negative immigration threat perception 
was anticipated in the case of ethnic national identity. The findings of this dissertation suggest 
that the correlation is not linear. The expectations that the British perceive immigrants as a 
lesser threat than the Germans are rejected, given the detailed data analysis which shows that 
the Germans have a more positive attitude towards immigrants. Moreover, the results point 
towards the idea that legal immigration has increased after some changes in the immigration 
policies of Germany and the UK. In this paper, a detailed analysis that includes realistic, 
symbolic and social threat was made. In all of them, German respondents are more tolerant 
towards immigrants compared to British. This leads us to the conclusion that the concept of 
civic and ethnic national identity should be reconsidered. Having in mind these new empirical 
findings, the latter should be reformulated. 
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People have constantly moved across cities, states, and continents. However, over the previous 
decades migration flows have been continuously increasing and are expected to rise even more. 
In 2015, around 244 million people were living outside their country of origin (G20 and OECD 
migration trends report, 2017, p. 5). From a European perspective, growing immigration flows 
had brought about one of the biggest structural changes that countries have undergone during 
the last decades. According to the newest Euro barometer data published in June 2018, the 
leading concern1 at the European Union (EU) level remains immigration, with 38 percent of 
mentions. In autumn 2017, 39 percent of respondents answered that immigration is the main 
concern at European level. Concretely, in Germany and in the United Kingdom (UK) 42 
percent and 29 percent of the respondents respectively, put immigration as one of the main 
concerns of the EU. In addition, 33 percent of UK s respondents and 23 percent of the German 
respondents put the health and social security as one of the main concerns (Standard Euro 
barometer 89, 2018, pp. 4 7).  
In this context, it is of great importance to analyze the relationship between the immigration 
attitudes and threat perceptions of German and British respondents in order to get a better 
understanding of the relationship between their national identity and the group threat towards 
immigrants. The willingness to accept immigration flows by German and British citizens is one 
of the key factors for their social stability2 since both countries3 were among the top 
                                                 
1 Also, we should mention the remaining main concerns at European level according to Barometer 89. Right after 
immigration as a leading concern with 38% mentions, in second position is terrorism at 29% (which is -9 and -15 
since spring 2017). In third position is the economic situation (at 18% +1), public finances in fourth position (at 
on the sixth place together with climate change (11%, -1), which has a double-digit score for the second 
consecutive time (Barometer 89, 2018, p. 4). 
2 Social stability in Germany is overall stable and unrest risks are usually low according to the Country Monitor 
Report made by IHS Global Inc (2018, p. 3). However, the risks of anti-immigration, anti-government and anti-
Islam are evident, but usually followed by German citizens  counter-demonstration. For instance, in Berlin in May 
2018 almost 20,000 people protested, against 5,000 Alternative for Germany (AfD) right-wing supporters. During 
the G20 summit in Hamburg in 2017, and in Berlin as well, far-left protests have confronted the police with 





destination countries of immigrants. On the other hand, the rate of emigration4 in the United 
Kingdom and Germany which traditionally had large Diasporas, have moved down (G20 
OECD migration trends report, 2017). 
In fact, this study aims to clarify the possible determinants of people s attitudes towards 
immigration and to relate them with people s civic or ethnic national identification. National 
identity reflects a sense of belonging possessed by the people in one country or nation, or the 
feeling of solidarity one has with a particular group based on shared heritage (Smith, 1992, p. 
59). The main assumptions that determine conceptualization of nationhood are: common 
origin, historical events and myths, common culture, territorial connection of the people with 
their land of birth, ownership of resources and possessions in the homeland that has a single 
system of constitutional rights and responsibilities under a common rule and authorship 
(Smith, 1992, p. 60). The core dichotomy of national identity lays in the analysis made by a 
historian Hans Kohn (1891 1971) who popularized the Civic-West and Ethnic-East 
distinction. He argued that in the UK, the Netherlands, France, and the USA, or in the West, 
nationalism was mainly political. According to him, the basis of nationalism and nation ideas 
in the West is a common culture within prior state structures. For Western or civic nationalists, 
being a member of the nation equated as having a citizenship of that nation. Therefore, the 
formation of the state in this model of nationality is a developed nation, or the nation is the 
basis of the state (Kohn, 1946). On the other hand, in Central and Eastern part of Europe as 
well as Asia, nationalism arose in polities. Smith points out that, each nation has both civic and 
ethnic identification characteristics. Thus, it is a matter of the dominant components that one 
                                                                                                                                                          
the UK contributed to the EU referendum in July 2016, when the leave vote was predominant. During that period, 
the racialization of immigrants and immigration escalated. The media and several outlets used strong language 
that established distinction between British citizen (Self) and European immigrant (Other) (ibid.). 
3 According to the G20 OECD migration trends report (2017), the USA is the main immigration country in 2015 
with 2.5 million permanent and temporary migrants. Right after it is Germany with 2 million people inflow, while 
Saudi Arabia is third having 1.5 million Asian migrant workers in the same year. Among the G20 countries that 
received more than half a million new migrants is the United Kingdom having 550 000 migrant workers and 
Canada with 513 000 inflows.  
4 The definition of emigration in Oxford Dictionary is the act of leaving one





country has, to be qualified as a nation with civic or as a nation with an ethnic national identity 
(Smith, 1992, p. 60). These two types of national identity have five common characteristics 
that explain the term national identity in general: a homeland or historic territory, common 
history and myths, common culture, common duties and legal rights and common economy 
(Smith, 1991, p. 14).   
For that reason, it seems possible to suggest that there is a possibility that national identity 
distinction made by Kohn (1946) had an impact on the attitudes toward immigration trends. At 
the same time, however, other factors influencing attitudes by native citizens must be 
considered in order to get a better understanding of the relationship between these phenomena. 
This thesis has the following objectives: 
1. To determine if there is a correlation between people s attitudes towards immigration 
and people s civic or ethnic national identification; 
2. To provide a thorough analysis of immigration policies of Germany and Britain in 
order to give a specific policy recommendation. 
The main goal of this thesis is to clarify the hidden issue of the growing immigration-related 
threat within the broader context of national identification. What is more, this study is an 
attempt to show that growing immigration flows have an impact on changes that take place 
within immigration policies of Germany and the UK. This piece of work finds its relevance in 
showing how immigration-related attitudes of German and British citizens are correlated with 
their national identity. 
Previous studies on national identity and threat perception towards immigration in Europe have 
indicated a correlation between people with strong sense of ethnic identity and negative 
attitude towards immigrants (Kuhnel and Leibold, 2004, p. 145; Terwey, 2004, p. 70; Wasmer 
and Koch, 2004, p. 100). On the other hand, civic nationalists do not have a negative or 
positive attitude towards immigrants (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson and Armstrong, 2001; Heath, 
Anthony, and Tilley, 2005, p. 119; Heath and Roberts, 2008). However, civic and ethnic 
nationalism is one dimension of attachment to one s nation. Another dimension is the degree of 
effective attachment to a particular nation, meaning that the sense of belonging can be stronger 




of one nation tends to place greater emphasis on the common culture, tradition and descent and 
minor importance on a voluntary option of political membership. However, the civic 
conception of national identity supports immigrants that have respect for political institutions, 
possess national citizenship and speak the national language (Smith, 1991). In other words, in-
group citizens with a high level of civic identity should not be against immigration if 
immigrants respect the institutions and follow the rules and regulations of the state. With that 
in mind, the main question of this thesis is stated as follows: how did national identification 
formulate the immigration-related threat perception in Germany and the UK? In order to 
examine the correlation between the two phenomena, the following hypotheses are to be tested: 
1. The rate of negative attitudes towards immigration tends to increase among those who 
have ethnic national identification; 
2. The rate of negative attitudes towards immigration tends to decrease among those who 
have civic national identification; 
3. Facilitating immigration regulation increases the inflow of regular migrants and tends 
to diminish negative attitudes towards immigration. 
Considered that this research is focused on national identity, the main hypotheses are analyzed 
through the theory of nationalism and national identity. As put forward in the prior studies and 
research on the correlation between national identity and threat perceptions toward 
immigration, social norms and historical background play a significant role regarding 
dynamics between these two phenomena. As observed by primordial nationalism scholars, 
nationalism focuses on inherent and historic social practices as the origin of the nation itself. In 
other words, nation-building is based on ethnicity and nationalists are loyal to the nation not to 
the state (Anbarani, 2013, p. 64). The constructivist national theory goes beyond the ethnic 
origins of primordial national theory and shifts the conception of national identity theory. First 
introduced by theorists such as Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and Eric Hobsbawm, the 
constructivist theory is premised on the assumption that the nation is not a pre-existing nor 
mythical. It is a social construct, an entity which was made on the premise of social interaction. 
It exists due to its own recognition, opposing the primordial argument of ethnic, ideological or 
racial mutuality existing in a group of people (Finkel, 2016, p. 4). That said, the civic and 




 in this case, the German and British citizens  only if they acknowledge such 
conceptualization via social practice and interaction. 
In the first chapter, I introduce the topic relevance through short literature review and an 
appropriate statistical data. Also, I explain the reasons why this problematique is important and 
relevant. I also put forward the objectives and the main aim of the thesis as well as the three 
hypothesis that are tested. 
In the second chapter I give theoretical elaboration. I commence by conceptualizing 
nationalism, after which I give special emphasis on the theories of nationalism explaining the 
distinction between ethnic and civic national identification. In this chapter I also elaborate on 
the Group Threat Theory, discuss the beliefs people have or about stereotypes and their 
Immigration-related Threat Perceptions. Also, this chapter provides basic definitions of the 
prevailing immigration-related threats which are the following: realistic threat, symbolic threat, 
and social threat.  
The third chapter of this thesis has two parts. The first one gives some information on the 
historical context of nationalism, citizenship and threat perception towards immigrants in 
Germany and in the UK. The first sub-chapter looks into the history of nationalism while the 
second sub-chapter explores the different citizenship policies and immigration-related threat 
perceptions in the UK and Germany. This part gives a better understanding and good basis for 
analyzing the immigration control policies in these two countries. The second part of this 
chapter encompasses two segments of analysis. The third sub-chapter includes analysis of the 
current immigration control policies in Germany and the UK. The fourth sub-chapter takes 
account of the second segment analysis i.e. the analysis of the immigration policies of 
Germany and Britain, which conceivably influence on the increased inflow of regular migrants 
and tends to diminish the negative attitudes towards immigration.  
The fourth chapter gives methodological explanation that seeks to determine how the 
immigration attitudes in Germany and the UK are correlated with their age, education and 
citizenship. Creating a highly plausible causation between the ethnic or civic national identity 
and the shift in immigration-related attitudes requires further data collection and analysis. This 




2 Theoretical Framework 
 
This part of the Master thesis has the function of representing the theoretical framework used 
in this thesis from a broader perspective. This chapter includes the main theoretical 
assumptions of theories of nationalism which are explained aiming to set the initial theoretical 
base to explain the research variables. Additionally, this part focuses on explaining how 
immigration-related threat perceptions are correlated with immigration stereotypes. Group 
threat theory explains the role of immigration-related threat perceptions in the conflict of in-
group and out-group citizens. Both theories will be utilized in order to set the stage for the 
analytical framework around the focus of attention of this thesis, and in that respect support the 
arguments presented in the analysis. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the theoretical 
framework as it would contribute to a better understanding of the concepts used to examine the 
problem under discussion.  
 
2.1 Conceptualization of nationalism 
Nationalism is one of the few political theories that bring about disagreement and opposed 
opinions. At the same time, assumptions of national identity or national status are the usual 
starting point of the world s most terrible and long-drawn-out conflicts. Nationalism and 
attachments of nationality are exerting a hold over the minds and attitudes of people in a global 
sense even today. From this point of view, the following question arises: why men and women 
even now respond to what Anderson (1991, p. 40) calls imagined community  and are 
prepared to make life sacrifice to defend it from external adversaries? As seen by nationalists, 
the division of nations as incomparable and distinctive entities have always existed 
(Hutchinson and Smith, 2000). 
Let us begin by analyzing the meaning of the word nation . To the Romans, the meaning of 
the word natio , was something born, and the perfect form of it meant I have been born  
(Zernatto, 1944, pp. 360 362). Also, several foreign people who were outside Roman stratum 
but had similar origin among themselves were considered as natio . The lodgings where these 




Machiavelli used it to describe the Ghibelline party,5 Dante Alighieri used the word nazione  
as a designation for men that originated from one city or province and Montesquieu used the 
word nation as a representation by aristocrats or a representative assembly (ibid.). The clear 
boundary between nation and people was made at the beginning of the French Revolution, or 
in June 1789 when the House of Representatives was named: assemblee nationale  (ibid.). 
However, the usage of the word nation increased after the 18th century, when the domestic 
political debate became national , compared to the 19th century when everything was termed 
progressive  and in 20th  democratic or totalitarian  (ibid.). 
Max Weber who was a German political economist, sociologist and a pioneer of the theory of 
nationalism noted that the nation originates from the sentiments of prestige, and has no 
economic origin (Ringer, 2004, p. 51). According to Weber, the idea of nation  is based on 
the naked prestige of power , which is under influence of the nationalist notion used by 
intellectually privileged ones  who perceive themselves as specific partners with a specific 
culture (ibid.). Weber also stated that people of the state  should not be confused with the 
nation  itself, since the state is comprised by groups that are not part of the nation, or a state 
can have several homogeneous nations  as Austro-Hungary had before 1918. Also, one nation 
cannot be distinguished by the language used by its people: examples are North Americans and 
Irish, Serbs and Croats. According to Weber, even though they use the same language, they 
have different nations (Weber, 1948, pp. 171 174). Each nation has people that are less 
affiliated and more associated with it. Weber noted that the German, the English, and the 
French national sentiment  vary and cannot be identical. This idea has been facilitated by the 
notion that the nation is cultivated by the peculiarity of the people. The mission was also 
named as cultural  mission, which represented the irreplaceable and superior culture and 
values (Weber, 1948, p. 176).  
A political explanation of nationalism was made by Anthony Giddens. He asserted that 
nationalism cannot be approached without considering the psychological and cultural 
                                                 
5 The Ghibelline was one of the two most powerful parties in Medieval European politics. This party was 




association of sovereignty and the territorial state and paid attention to the way the state 
supported the boundaries of its sovereign bordered land (Giddens, 1985, pp. 56 70). In the 
introduction of a multi-volume collection of nationalism edited by John Hutchinson and 
Antony D. Smith (2000, p. xxvi) four approaches of nationalism were identified: primordial, 
perennialism, modernism, and ethno-symbolism. 
The earliest version of today s nationalism has been known as primordialism. Primordial and 
natural nation represents all human conditions beyond history and time. The laws of nature 
have been assumed by Romantics6 as a constituting element of the French nation dating from 
1789 (Berghe, 1978). This approach is considered as too general and problematic. More 
concretely, should myths of ethnic descent be considered as being correlated with the actual 
biological descent? Also, many nations have heterogenic ethnic origins which are opposed to 
the primordial argument explaining that nations have a homogeneous ethnic origin. According 
to Antony Smith (1991, p. 12), nations are created with the help of collective memories, myths, 
symbols and traditions which can be made in two ways. The first way is through the 
incorporation of people coming from lower classes and distant areas by aristocrats in the 
bureaucracy. That was the case in the Western European countries. The second way is through 
mobilization of people by aristocratic ethnie  which according to Smith occurred in Eastern 
Europe and parts of Asia (Smith, 1991, pp. 12 16). The problems that this approach has is the 
constant inclination of collective identity interpretation, comprehending the linkage between 
modern nations and pre-modern ethnies , and tautologically explaining the character of 
nationalism by mentioning pre-existing and blood relative ethnicity. This approach has 
excluded historical records, but the next approach is based namely on the historical aspects as 
part of the creation of nationalism (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 16). 
The perennial approach founded its theory on the historical aspects of nationalism. According 
to this approach, ethnic communities and nations can be found in each historical period and in 
every corner of the world. Nations are not natural and primordial; instead, they are immemorial 
                                                 
6 Early Romantic nationalism was strongly inspired by Rousseau, and by the ideas of Johann Gottfried von 
Herder. After the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon movements in other nations were inspired self-




or timeless and perennial or eternal. The perennial paradigm has two approaches: continuous 
Perennialism and Perennialism in which individual members continually emerge and dissolve 
(Seton-Watson, 1977, pp. 16 19).   
The constructivist approach, on the other hand, has concentrated on nationalism as an 
economic entity. The constructivist approach to nationalism is also called modernist. Ernest 
Gellner (1964) defines nationalism as an invention by nations that do not exist. According to 
him, nations have become a necessity in a sociological context for the industrial modern 
society and are socially constructed. The traditional society has started eroding by the great 
tide of technological modernization - industrialization, which directly influenced on the role 
relationships, the way of mobilizing peasants and ruling cities. The new industrialism and 
cultural communication have started to be defined as structure . As Gellner explains, in the 
modern society, one must be literate as well as numerate in order to participate in it. Therefore, 
the leader of the nation is the one who enables the people to have access to public education 
which is under the state s control. On the one hand, class/social conflicts arose in the cities 
between new inhabitants and old residents, which is caused by job competition, formal 
education, and housing. On the other hand, cultural and ethnic conflicts are likely to be ensured 
as a result of different language, customs and religion of the newcomers compared to the old 
inhabitants. Hence, nationalism generates new nations on both sides of the economic 
modernization division (Gellner 1964, pp. 12 16). However, according to Tom Nairn (1977), it 
is not the industrial modernization that creates the uneven distribution of resources, but it is 
capitalism. He states his argument by explaining that peripheral areas are reduced by the 
imperialist exploitation and are placed in a situation of helpless dependency or as he stated 
underdevelopment . In this case, Nairn argues that the intelligentsia and landowners of the 
peripheral areas tried to resist the chains  of imperialism, with the help of the people. Thus, 
they organized the masses and asked them to be part of the formation of the history , offering 
them to use their peasant language and culture. Nairn calls it populist, romantic or inter-class 
side of nationalism, which is created as a result of the uneven deeds of world political economy 
(Nairn, 1977, pp. 30 35). Nairn was under the influence of Hroch who made a model of 
European nationalist movements in stateless nations, particularly for its social composition. 
His model consisted of three phases: phase A: intellectuals forming one cultural society, phase 
B: creation of political organizations by political agitators and phase C: mobilization of lower 




argument is supported by Michael Hechter. In his view, the periphery depends on the core  of 
the state which was caused by the industrial capitalism. However, in his case, the peripheral 
area was annexed long ago by the spreading of one national state. He used the British model 
and the relations of Britain with Wales, Ireland, and Scotland, starting in the 16th century. In 
his view, the increased interaction between them in the 18th century happened as a result of the 
emerging industrialization. That caused a cultural division of labor . In other words, the high-
status roles were taken by the society that has the core culture i.e. the British society. Hence, 
low-status role opportunities were created only for the ones that had peripheral cultures 
(Hechter, 1975, pp. 66 68). The predominantly materialist explanations of nationalism tend to 
connect the emergence and creation of nations and nationalism to modernization and economic 
development. This model of nationalism fails to explain why some nations emerged before the 
advent of capitalism and lacks the explanation why people are ready to give up and sacrifice 
everything in the name of the nation (Hutchinson and Smith, 2000). Supporters of the idea that 
the nationalism emerged as an invention in the modern era are Hobsbawm, Gellner, and 
Anderson accompanied by their post-modern likeminded scholars. According to Hobsbawm 
(1990), two periods and types of nationality exist: the first period was between 1830 and 1870 
inspired by the French revolution, which represents the first type of nationalism: civic political 
nationalism; and the second period is between 1870 and 1914 which reappeared after the fall of 
the Russian Empire and decline of Austrian and Ottoman empires and was referred as Ethno-
linguistic type of nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1990, pp. 80 101). For Anderson (1991), the idea 
of nationalism is a cultural creation which is closely connected with religion and kinship. As 
stated before, he defined the nation as an imagined political community which is cross-class 
finite and sovereign. According to him, the rise of print capitalism  was one of the 
contributors to the process of creation of the nation. The mass communication predestined 
huge production of newspapers, books, and pamphlets written in the mother language of the 
people (Anderson, 1991). Also, the Protestantism and the administrative language 
standardization by the European states created a new sociological society of linguistic nation 
which started from America and was spread in Europe, Asia and Africa (Hobsbawm, 1990, pp. 
33 37). Ernest Gellner argued that economically privileged communities can be politically 
underprivileged, referring to colonies or supressed nations within the empires. If the conditions 




Ethno-symbolism is the last approach to nationalism. Historical sociologists consider the pre-
existing cultural elements of memory, myth, symbol, tradition, and values which are the raw 
materials by which every nation is created. Therefore, the possibility of one nation to be 
created before modern nationalism can be considered as possible. The cultural sources of 
modern nations make a huge impact on the creation of nations, as well as the sense of ethnic 
identity, is crucial for its formation. John Hutchinson gave importance to cultural nationalism 
and to cultural nationalism sources in pre-modern culture and ethnicity (Hutchinson, 1987, pp. 
495 500). Armstrong emphasized the persistence of ethnic identity and the endurance of 
myth-symbol complexes  for the purpose of keeping ethnic boundaries (Armstrong, 1982, pp. 
25 39).  
Several relatively fixed points can be deduced from the debate on nationalism and its 
formation. Firstly, most authors agree that nationalism and the creation of nation-states date 
from late 18th century revolutions. Second, the majority of nations emerged in the modern 
epoch. Third, the nation is perceived as a powerful collective force in the modern world. 
Aiming to define the kind of community that could make its own political power and his own 
homeland, scholars focused their attention on the role of language and historic culture as a key 
criterion of nationality. Afterward, two types or versions of nationalism were introduced: one 
with civic (political criteria of communication) and another with ethnic (cultural differences) 
(Hutchinson and Smith, 2000, pp. 25 60). 
2.2 National identity and its two forms: civic and ethnic  
Hans Kohn (1946) who was among the first scholars that researched and developed the idea of 
nationalism described it as a state of mind. He noted that nationalism is a driver which enables 
people to translate their consciousness into organized action. Therefore, nationality as an idea, 
or an idee-force , which holds one group together aiming to express the highest form of 
organization, which is a sovereign state. Before developing a sovereign state, nationality 
satisfies itself with basic forms of organization, where one can find liberation . The creation 
of a nation-state is interdependent and closely related and with nationalism. According to 
Kohn, the Western world, or in England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United 
States and the British dominions, the extent of nationalism increased because of predominant 
political occurrence, which was followed by formation of the nation state. However, outside 




nationalism happened later and at a more underdeveloped stage of democratic, political and 
social development, and the main goal was to create conformity with ethnographic demands 
instead of creating a nation-state. Hence, the first demonstration of the Eastern nationalism was 
through the cultural field or using propaganda and through education instead via government 
and policy-making. Nevertheless, as Kohn (1946) stated, this type of nationalism was 
influenced by the West, which was used as a model in the East. Kohn connected the Western 
nationalism with rational cosmopolitanism and the concept of individual liberty. Nationalism 
in the West was built on the social and political base, while nationalism in the East or in 
Germany was based on natural  fact of a community, founded on status and kinship. The 
concept of citizenship was substituted by Volk  (translated in English as nation/community of 
people) which is a very vague concept discovered by German humanists and developed by 
German Romantics. It was based on emotions and imagination, not on ratio and consciousness. 
The conceptualization of nationalism and nation was different and caused by the historical 
difference (Kohn, 1946, p. 331). 
The World War in 1914 was caused and triggered by European nationalism. The conflicts and 
unresolved aspirations by nationalists in central Europe which started in 1848, sparked the fire. 
According to Kohn, it was initiated by Germans, inspired by Bismarck, who wanted to 
establish European hegemony. The validity of Western civilization was destroyed by this war, 
which leaded to modern civilization crisis. However, this civilization was strengthened after 
the Second World War. Germany, at least its major part, returned to the West and became the 
Federal Republic. Almost normal  phenomenon of war between Franco-Germans became 
unthinkable. Finally, the age of pan-nationalism was established in the Western states, aiming 
to aid and fasten the rise of undeveloped countries in order to overcome the challenge of 
communism and fascism (Kohn, 1946, p. 127). 
The identity of one nation-state has two components: quantitative and qualitative.7  Two forms 
of above mentioned qualitative national identity have been identified by nationalism scholars: 
                                                 
7 The quantitative component considers the degree of national identification or the strength of membership of the 
citizens in the national community and the positive relation towards that community. From the qualitative 





civic and ethnic national identity. People that are considered having civic national identity give 
importance to the following criteria (Shulman, 2004, p. 37): living on a common territory, 
belief in common political principles, possession of state citizenship, representation by a 
common set of political institutions and desire or consent to be part of the nation  to unite of 
distinguishing their nation. On the other hand, people with ethnic national identity give 
importance to the following features which unify or split the nation (Shulman, 2004, p. 38): 
common ancestry, culture, language, religion, traditions, and race.  Nevertheless, scholars 
agree that one nation has a combination of these two forms of qualitative national identity, but 
the degree of the civic and ethnic components can be greater depending on the country. Hans 
Kohn (1946, p. 329) made a distinction between the civic component of national identity and 
the ethnic one: the civic is considered as Western nationalism and the ethnic component of 
national identity is considered as Eastern nationalism  (as cited in Shulman, 2004, p. 38). 
However, one of the authors who disagrees with the West-East dichotomy of national identity 
is Krzysztof Jaskutowski. He argues with Kohn s (1946) conceptualization of national identity 
types and, discusses whether this discrimination is valid and useful (Jaskutowski, 2010). 
According to this author, Kohn was responsible for making a distinction between these two 
types of nationalism, which was made in a strongly moralistic way of differentiation, namely 
good  nationalism was related with the West, and negative  nationalism was typically 
related with the non-Western world (Jaskutowski, 2010, p. 290). His West-East distinction was 
based on seven different dimensions: ideological, geographical, sociological, political, 
chronological, psychological and historical.8  He came up with the following conclusions 
                                                                                                                                                          
reasons why they are part of it. This component of national identity is closely related to the characteristics that 
 that is different from others. Moreover, those characteristics and traits 
that one nation defines as exclusive, create the criteria for national membership but as well make barriers between 
in-group (or the national group) and out-group (Shulman, 2004, p. 37). 
8 The first dimension, or the dimension that attacked the most attention was the ideological dimension, from 
which civic and ethnic terminology emerged. However, these terms were not used by Kohn (1944), instead he 
used politically oriented and culturally oriented nations. By politically oriented countries he meant: countries that 
concentrate on government and policy-making process, society based on the idea of social contract where the 
rights, universalistic counties. In short, this type of nationalism was associated with democracy, liberalism and 
empowered civil society.  By culturally oriented counties he thought of: countries focusing on education, 





(Jaskutowski, 2010): First, the civic/ethnic dichotomy that Kohn proposed has regularly led 
many authors to represent countries only as civic or ethnic. Second, from his point of view, any 
oversimplified categorization of complete international locations in singular phrases (ethnic or 
civic) is reductionist and does not justify the necessary internal heterogeneity of one country.  
The production and consumption of culture, as well as nation-state constitution, has related to 
overused catchword national identity . However, according to Schlesinger (1987), it is far 
from clear, what national identity or phrases like cultural identity  or transnational identity  
really mean. The conceptualization of identity is problematic, although most authors claim that 
it deals mostly with the individual s relationship with the society (Schlesinger, 1987, p. 231). 
Schlesinger argues that the concept of national identity should be understood as one kind of 
collective identity. The basic approach of national identity that he adopted lies along activism. 
In other words, the participation of groups and individuals in the creation of their identity, 
triggered by decisions and projects, is the baseline on which national identity should be 
approached. Schlesinger analyzed national identity theories by Gellner (1983) and Anderson 
(1983). Gellner s explanation of how national identity emerged is that it was created as a by-
product of the emergence of the nation-state, which itself was a result of the global trend of 
industrialization. In his model, the usage of national language that was spread through the 
                                                                                                                                                          
factors such as birth, where national sovereignty was considered in collectivistic terms or as a sui generis which is 
above individuals, nations having irrational and mystical nationalism - roots of which lie  in the remote part of 
nationalism which look back to the lost folk-spirit and lost folk-soul, idealistic and utopian nationalism founded 
on imaginary visions based on emotions and particularistic countries having in mind only their national egoism 
that are eager to press and forcefully impose their values to other societies. In short, culturally oriented nations go 
hand in hand with autocracy, exclusion and use of power by the political state (Jaskutowski, 2010, p. 294). For 
Kohn, politically oriented nationalism or Western nationalism emerged after the nation-states appeared. Western 
world consolidated the newly emerged nation-states via inclusive approach. On the other hand, the nationalism in 
the non-Western world was divisive and subversive which was against entities which supported state coherence 
along cultural lines. The next dimension on which the West-East dichotomy was based is the chronological 
dimension. By this dimension, Kohn (1944) explained that the Western nationalism was made before the non-
West, which made the former be the model and mentor for the non-Western world. In other words, the non-
Western nationalism was secondary and based on imitations. By psychological dimension, Kohn noted that the 
non-Western world felt forced to imitate the West but at the same time they rejected it, which led them to over-
reaction. And finally, the last dimension on which Kohn's dichotomy was based is the historical dimension. Kohn 




educational system was the crucial element to the creation of national unity (Schlesinger, 1987, 
p. 248). On the other hand, according to Benedict Anderson (1983), the formation of national 
identity was accelerated by print capitalism . Mother language usage provided the perfect 
setting for the national consciousness building (Anderson, 1983, p. 63). The thrust of 
capitalism which was revolutionary vernacularized, according to Anderson, gave additional 
impetus by the following factors: it transformed the character of the Latin language which now 
became arcane, the Reformation and its impact to print-capitalism, enabled printing of book 
translations and Biblical translations. A huge reading public emerged, who understood little or 
no Latin, thus forming religious and political mobilizations that happened simultaneously were 
used as centralizing administrative instruments used by absolute monarchs. He concluded that 
the convergence of capitalism and the print technology diversified the human language and 
made the creation of new forms of imagined communities  plausible (Anderson, 1991, pp. 40
43). Finally, Schlesinger (1987) concludes that national identity can be understood as a specific 
kind of collective identity. National identity is constituted at one strategic level of a society. 
Formally, one that analyses the processes of exclusion and inclusion in a society can talk about 
national identity. He considered that distinction between the concept of national identity and 
the concept of nationalism should be made in order to open up a more discrimination path into 
the processes of mobilization of collective sentiment in the national context,  which will allow 
multiple versions that are hidden by a single concept (Schlesinger, 1987, p. 259). 
Having in mind that multiple networks of social relations are overlapping, as well as the huge 
international flows of cultural productions, ideas, and language, it is very difficult for scholars 
to define concepts like nation or nationalism (Calhoun, 1993, p. 216). Nationalisms can be 
based on two different claims of national identity: the first replaces traditional identity or 
ethnicity with a modern or true nation, and the second claims that the national identity and 
sovereignty have the origin in ancient ethnicity. Calhoun takes France and Germany as 
examples (Calhoun, 1993, p. 227). The three foundations of national identity are the following: 
core territory, bases of community and opposition groups9 (Orridge and Williams, 1982, p. 21). 
                                                 
9 The first precondition is core territory where total population is concentrated to be credible for elites to identify 





In his book National Identity, Anthony Smith (1991) defined two types of a nation: civic and 
ethnic national identity (Smith, 1991, p. 9). According to him, these two conceptions are the 
two ideal types, but, each nation has both civic and ethnic characteristics. Thus, it is a matter of 
the dominant components that one country has, to be qualified as a nation with civic or a nation 
with an ethnic national identity (Smith, 1991, pp. 13 14). Also, these two types of national 
identity have five common characteristics that explain the term national identity in general: a 
homeland or a historic territory, common history and myths, a common culture, common 
duties and legal rights and common economy with territorial mobility its citizens. Also, Smith 
defines two other types of national identity: lateral national identity and vertical national 
identity.10 The national identity reflects the sense of belonging possessed by the people in one 
country or nation, or the feeling of solidarity that a group has based on shared heritage. This 
concept is very complex and abstract. One of the main assumptions that conceptualize 
nationhood are:  territorial connection of the population with their homeland the common 
myths, origin and historical events that have occurred in that community, common culture that 
connects people, shared territorial division of labor mobility for all members, ownership of 
resources of all members in the homeland and the possession by all members of a single 
system of common rights and obligations under common regulations and authorities (Smith, 
1991, p. 60). 
2.3 Group Threat Theory and Immigration-related Threat Perceptions 
Group threat theory says that immigration-related threat perceptions result from intergroup 
clash for limited resources and culminates when the position of the in-group is put into 
                                                                                                                                                          
existence of cultural infrastructure or element of cultural uniqueness which is crucial for one nation to be self-
defined. The final precondition for national identity is existence of opposition groups which triggers autonomist 
nationalism or the nationalism that occurred in the 19th and 20th Century (Orridge and Williams, 1982, pp. 22
24). 
10 The former one is built by the dominant ethnic group in the society, usually the aristocratic part of it, or with 
top-down approach. Namely, this lateral national identity is based on the dominant and powerful ethnic identity 
which after is integrated by the other ethnic groups. On the other hand, the latter national identity or vertical is 
built with bottom-up approach which includes each of the ethnic groups and borrows their traditions, customs and 
beliefs. Therefore, the community with lateral national identity is not that stable and compact as the one with 




question by the arrival of immigrants (Bobo, 1999; Callens, Meuleman, and Valentova, 2015). 
The in-group reacts to immigration-related threats by developing stereotypes, prejudices, and 
discrimination. 
Rinehart gives a very important explanation regarding three interrelated components of 
antagonistic inter-group relations: stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination (Rinehart, 1963, p. 
136). Stereotypes are the beliefs that men and women have toward ethnic, national, racial or 
religious group. Prejudice is the feeling about such groups. Finally, discrimination is the 
manner of behavior by people toward those groups (Rinehart, 1963, p. 163). In this subchapter, 
I discuss the beliefs people have or about stereotypes, because stereotypes about immigrants 
play a major part in understanding the problematique of this thesis, which makes this concept 
very important for additional analysis. Stereotypes are a result of generalization referring to the 
traits of members of the social group by a diminishment of the differences within the group 
generalizations, based on biased and inaccurate sources and observations (Ibid.). As put 
forward by Rinehart (1963, p. 137), stereotypes are oversimplified, and subjective beliefs 
specified as categorical generalizations about members of groups. The members of stereotyped 
groups are usually described by their physical appearance, personality or their intelligence. In 
this manner, stereotypes serve to bring about discrimination and prejudice (Rinehart, 1963, p. 
138). 
Immigration-related threat perceptions have several sources. According to Stephan, Ybarra, 
Martinez, Schwarzwald and Tur-Kaspa (1998), threats can be classified as realistic threats, 
symbolic threats, inter-group anxiety and negative stereotypes. In-group members perceive a 
realistic threat when the out-group members are threatening the existence of the former, and 
they start questioning their economic and political power. It involves competition related to 
jobs, territory, and health (Callens, Meuleman, and Valentova, 2015, p. 7). From the economic 
aspect, there is a potential threat that the usage of the community resources and the social 
services by the immigrants can reduce their availability. Scholars emphasize two main 
concerns that influence on anti-immigrant attitudes: labor market competition and the fiscal 
burden on public services (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010, p. 1). The clash of interest of the in-
group and out-group is since resources such as houses, and good job positions are scarce, thus 




Nonetheless, many recent studies show that the economic aspect is not the main aspect that 
influences individuals  attitudes. Indeed, the scholarly work is not consistent while describing 
the main reason for attitudes of native citizens, or whether it is based on the economic or 
cultural threat. Focusing on the cultural aspect, the immigrants that refuse to assimilate to the 
society may threaten host citizens. Symbolic threats are based on perceived differences in 
beliefs, norms, and values (Gonzalez, Verkuyten, Weesie, and Poppe, 2008, p. 669). Symbolic 
boundaries also separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group 
membership. They are an essential medium through which people acquire status and 
monopolize resources (Lamont and Molnar, 2002, p. 170). In addition, immigrants are 
perceived as a threat to the collective identity. Jenkins argues that collective identity is a 
dialectic interplay of processes of internal and external definition  (Jenkins, 2008, p. 38).  
Therefore, the individuals should be able to differentiate themselves, but also outsiders should 
be able to identify the collective identity. Moreover, the symbolic boundaries help native-born 
citizens to distinguish themselves from the out-group, which increases the possibility to arise 
intolerance. Thus, the symbolic threat will increase the fear of the native population. Social 
threat derives from social differences manifested in unequal access to an unequal distribution 
of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities. They are also revealed in 
stable behavioral patterns of association (Lamont and Molnar, 2002, p. 171).  
The symbolic threat can be perceived by in-group members when their system of values is at 
stake, and they perceive a threat related to beliefs, standards, values, and attitudes (Mc 
Conachay, 1998). The competitive aspect of those threats is the main feature perceived by in-
group members as a bad competition and good for the out-group. Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, and 
Armstrong (2001) state that the instrumental modus of group threat theory lays mainly in the 
following two factors: resources stress which incused uneven distribution of resources, 
scarcity, and desire for unbalanced distribution, and potential competitive out-group (ibid.). 
Pichastor, Muñoz-Rojas, Invernizzi Gamba and Mugny (2004, p. 145) argue that perceived 
threats by the in-group do not moderate the in-group norms. He states that threats predict 
discrimination and prejudice (Pichastor, Muñoz-Rojas, Invernizzi Gamba and Mugny, 2004, p. 
145). 
Riek, Mania and Gaertner (2006) in their research article investigated the relationship between 




threats: realistic threat, symbolic threat, negative stereotypes, intergroup anxiety, 
distinctiveness threat and group esteem threat. After conducting a meta-analysis of almost 100 
samples they concluded that all threat types were correlated with negative out-group attitudes 
(Riek, Mania and Gaertner, 2006).   
Stephan and Renfro (2002) concluded that there are five factors that lead to the perception of 
inter-group threats: personality traits and related personal characteristics, attitudes and related 
cognitions, personal experiences with the out-group, situational factors, and prior and current 
inter-group relations (Stephan and Renfro, 2002).  
As it was shown above, the main premises of the group threat theory can serve as a useful 
investigative tool for analyzing the way stereotypes; prejudice and discrimination create and 
form the questions of immigration-related threats. More importantly, this theory can support us 
studying the influence of the attitudes toward immigration by in-group citizens.   
2.4 Immigration Policy Theory 
It is necessary for this thesis to elaborate on the immigration policies. There exists an 
immigration policy theory that specially deals with the issues of immigration policies, 
however, it is not well defined and lacks a debate among different schools of thought on the 
topic. Still, in the further analysis, we will attempt to explore the immigration policies of 
specific receiving countries.  
As put forward by Meyers (2000, p. 1246), immigration policy is comprised of two parts. The 
first part is immigration regulation or immigration control policy. It consists of the rules and 
procedures overseeing the selection and admittance of immigrants into a state. The second part 
of immigration policy is immigrant policy, i.e. the conditions that the receiving country 
provide to foreign citizens, such as educational opportunities, work conditions, welfare 
provisions and housing stipulations (ibid.).   
Since the immigration policy theory lacks deliberations, state decisions regarding how many 
immigrants it will allow into to stay on its territory can be evaluated through the lens of several 
approaches. According to Meyers (2000), six approaches explain this phenomenon (realism 
and liberalism by International Relations (IR) theory, Marxism, domestic politics and 




psychology). As an interdisciplinary subject, immigration policy uses IR theory, political 
science and sociology, and psychology (Meyers, 2000, p. 1246). 
In addition, the elaboration on immigration policy-making defers along two core aspects: the 
factors of analysis, i.e. the impact of ideas, institutions and interests in the forming of 
immigration policy and the level of analysis adopted, or the identification of the main source of 
immigration policy in the society, the state or the international community (Natter, 2018). The 
table below shows the outline of the theories that reflect on immigration policies and their 
prime focal point.  
Table 2.1: Categorizing immigration policy-making theories 
Theoretical lenses Factors of analysis Level of analysis 
Interests Ideas Institut
ions 
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National identity 
approach 




 X X   X 
Source: Natter (2018, p. 3).  
For this thesis, I will briefly elaborate on the first part of immigration policy theory i.e. 
immigration control policy which focuses on the admission and selection of immigrants and on 
combating illegal immigration. Also, a more comprehensive elaboration will be given 
regarding the access to citizenship and its impact on immigrant integration, or the second part 





3 Background data  
 
This chapter contains two parts. The first part explains the historical context of nationalism, 
citizenship and threat perception towards immigrants in Germany and in the UK. This part of 
the thesis gives a better understanding and good basis for analyzing the immigration control 
policies in these two countries. The first sub-chapter investigates the history of nationalism 
while the second sub-chapter explores the different citizenship policies and immigration-
related threat perceptions in the UK and Germany. The first part of chapter creates the 
conditions for the second part of it i.e. the analysis of immigration control policies of Germany 
and the UK. The second part of this chapter encompasses two segments of analysis. The first 
section of analysis includes the current immigration control policies in Germany and the UK 
whereas the second section of the analysis takes account of the analysis of the immigration 
policies of Germany and the UK. The aim of this chapter is to give a brief introduction and 
background information that is essential for investigating the correlations of dependent to 
independent variables in question. 
 
3.1 Brief history of nationalism in Germany and in the United Kingdom  
Since nationalism and national identification are important parts of this comparative analysis, it 
is likely that this subchapter will give the insight of those components about Germany and the 
United Kingdom. Understanding the core elements of the national identities of German and 
British nations is of a great importance to explain the different approaches both countries must 
compare them within the analysis that follows.  
3.1.1 National identification in Germany  
Nationalism in Germany emerged from the Reformation, compared to the Western Europe 
where the concept of nationalism was a product of the Renaissance (Kohn, 1946, p. 331). In 
the book, The Age of Nationalism  Kohn gave historical information about the rise and 
development of nationalism. According to him, nationalism dominated the educated classes in 




dominant concepts that prevailed in Germany were cosmopolitism and love of peace, praised 
by Kant and Goethe. However, after the Napoleon Wars ended, the claims of cosmopolitism 
and individual liberty were replaced by the claims of race and history (Kohn, 1968, p. 10). As 
he stated, the leading powers such as France, Britain and United States, have enabled various 
nationalities and racial strains to enter into their creation, instead of using racial theory, by 
which man is determined by his ancestry leading to pride, violence, tyranny, and abjection  
(Kohn, 1968, p. 19). As Tocqueville anticipated,  alone in Europe, the Germans possess the 
particular talent of becoming impassioned with what they take as abstract truths, without 
considering their practical consequences; they may furnish you with truly favorable audience 
whose opinions will sooner or later re-echo in France, for nowadays the whole divided world 
has become on , which at the end has proved true (Tocqueville, 1957, p. 2 in Kohn, 1968, p. 
19). 
Under modern conditions, the German nationalism was reborn. Between the two World Wars, 
nationalism was invoked, which became explosive and violent. German case of nationalism 
was closely connected to a minority group rivalry in an economic and cultural sense, and it 
also included recent loss of territory which by the normal nationalist criteria could very 
plausibly be claimed  (Gellner, 1974, p. 188). However, it was almost impossible to anticipate 
the invoking nature of German nationalism at that time. Also, one of the reasons that generated 
nationalism in Germany was the need for economic growth (Gellner, 1974, p. 190). 
A scholar that examined German history and national identity in the 1980s argued that the 
predominant factor of political identification of Germany has been the nationalism (Mommsen, 
1983, p. 572). Even though the expectations after the end of the Second World War were that 
the nationalism would lose its impact, it was the opposite. In other words, forgotten nationalist 
identities were reintroduced which triggered regional social, political and economic 
movements in Europe versus the nation-state (Mommsen, 1983, p. 574). He also stated that all-
Germans had a rather artificial sense of national consciousness after the 1st World War, as the 
East Germany was closely linked to the Prussian social and political culture while the West 
German public interest in the legacy of Prussia was rather sympathetic but then raised only 
transitory interest (Mommsen, 1983, p. 577). 
According to Ignatieff (1995), after the 1990 Germany become to the world-power nation and 




to the rest of the nations of imperial Europe (Ignatieff, 1995, p. 7). Germany as an ethnic 
nationalist state shows that individual s deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen. It is the 
national community that defines the individual, not individuals define national community  
(Ignatieff, 1995, p. 9). 
3.1.2 National identification in the United Kingdom  
As defined in Chapter 2, the sense of belonging to one nation can be related with its civic or 
with its ethnic premise. The civic should be understood as a type of nationalism is in relation to 
democracy, since it transfers the sovereignty to each citizen. It was recognized in the UK, 
which developed a civic rather than an ethnic way of nationalism having in mind that it has 
four different nations. Since most of the nations have more than one ethnicity, civic national 
identity type claims that common ethnicity does not of itself obliterate division, because 
ethnicity is only one of the many claims on an individual s loyalty. Moreover, this type of 
nationalism states that law holds a society together instead of having common ethnicity and 
roots (Ignatieff, 1995, p. 9). 
The rhetoric about nationalism was present with an internationalist and the imperialist United 
Kingdom. After 1870, most of the people that were fighting for improvement of the national 
protection and better state contribution in the UK were all at once correspondingly involved in 
internationalist initiatives  aiming to protect a multitude of constructions abroad, to fight for 
the formation of international institutions or through headship in European initiatives such as 
the European Year for Cultural Heritage or Europa Nostra  (Falser and Lipp, 2015, in 
Swenson, 2018, p. 63). 
National-state identity crisis has become relevant in the era of globalization. According to 
Zhuojun and Hualing (2014) there are two main reasons for the crisis: the impact of 
globalization and the failure of interaction between national states  internal governance 
(Zhuojun an Hualing, 2014, p. 149). Particularly, the national-state identity crisis in the UK 
happened because of a various historical condition. This country has a century s long part of its 
history when it was imperialistic, and its role was enormous in a global sense. However, its 
influence has been considerably reduced having in mind its welfare state crisis and visible 
economic decline, especially after its participation in the 1991 Gulf War when the UK had 




states, the class, region, race and gender classification which are no longer based on the British 
pride regarding the political system and institutions, imperial power and confidence, shifted the 
unity of the country (ibid.).  After the French and the American revolutions, the notion 
nationality started being defined in the constitutions, legal codes and regulations. However, 
that was not the case in the UK until 1948. The first Nationality Act was part of the British law 
after the Second World War. It was mostly referred as the end of the British shortcoming 
regarding nationalism (Dummett and Nicol, 1990).  
There was the joint supposition preceding the British Nationality Act of 1948 that British 
subjects were all who came under the power of the Crown. Also, a great emphasis was given 
on responsibilities and loyalties to the monarch compared to the rights (Piper, 1997, p. 76). A 
clear identification of the British identity was a necessity after the extensive immigration after 
the Second World War took place. Additionally, post-war immigration was only one of the 
reasons, the other trigger was the nationality and citizenship laws implemented by the former 
British territories. Before the British Nationality Act, the British nationality notion was 
inclusive, but after 1948 the focus of this Act was to define who should not be included in the 
British society as a British citizen, i.e. the notion changed to exclusive. That was followed by 
the redefinition of the British multinational and multiracial empire into a nation state (Piper, 
1997, p. 98). The following table 3.1 encompasses the most important legislative documents 
regarding national identity and immigration restriction in the UK. 
Table 3.1: British legislative document from 1948 to 1981  
The British Nationality Act 1948  Citizens of the UK and colonies  were noted as 
distinct from British subject  and British subject 
without citizenship  
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 Restricted primary immigration into the UK 
Immigration Act 1971 The concept of patriality  was introduced 
allowing immigrants with a British parent or 
grandparent 
British Nationality Act 1981 Abolished the long-standing reliance on ius soli 
(rule of birthplace) and limited the automatic 




Source: The British Nationality Acts (2017, pp. 4 7). 
Each of the above-mentioned legislative documents has gradually set up more restrictive 
conditions for immigrants to obtain citizenship (Gilroy, 1987).  
3.2 Brief history of citizenship and immigration policies in Germany and in the United 
Kingdom 
Even though the modern era of globalization has influenced the growing role of supranational 
(such as the EU) and international institutions (such as the United Nations), nation-states 
should not homogenize the stance regarding citizenship. According to Brubaker, there are two 
national models of citizenship. The first model of citizenship is akin to ius sanguinis (right of 
blood) or citizenship common to cultural traditions. According to this model of citizenship, 
cultural pluralism is more accepted since it allows the right of migrants to retain their religious 
and ethnic difference. The second model of citizenship is akin to ius soli which is common to 
political values and institutions and the state territory residence. This model of citizenship sets 
cultural obligations that migrants should abide to obtain citizenship (Brubaker, 2009, p. 12). 
When combining these two citizenship dimensions, according to Koopmans and Statham 
(2003, p.74) four ideal-typical national models are distinguished: 
 Table 2.3: Four ideal-typical national models 
Source: Koopmans and Statham (2003, p. 74). 
Ethno-cultural assimilationism, which according to Koopmans and Statham (2003) was until 
recently present in Germany, expects migrants to adapt to the culture and traditions of the 
country and gives limited access to the political community to migrants. In addition, migrants 
shall adapt to the cultural requirements to be good citizens . The second model is ethno 
cultural pluralism, which according to them is exercised by Switzerland. The difference 
between this model and the ethno cultural assimilationism is the freedom given to migrants to 
Ethno-cultural assimilationism Germany 
Ethno-cultural pluralism Switzerland 
Civic assimilationism France 




practice their culture and customs. The next type of citizenship is civic assimilationism whose 
example is France. The access to citizenship is open but there are a unitary culture and 
behavior in the public sphere, which migrants would accept. The last type is civic pluralism, 
which has three variations: Britain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. According to this model, 
citizens have the right to keep their cultural identities and express them in the public sphere, 
including the core institutions in the state, such as the media, the military, and schools 
(Koopmans and Statham, 2003, pp. 74 77). Indeed, these four models and countries are an 
example of each of the models cannot be confirmed fully, since one country can have multiple 
models simultaneously. 
Turner defines the concept of citizenship in an innovative way: set of practices (juridical, 
political, economic and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and 
which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups  (Turner, 
1993, p. 2). Obviously, citizenship as legal status  is just a single part of a more extensive 
origination of citizenship, enveloping equality in the usage of political, economic, civil and 
social rights. Citizenship is a legal status as well as a social practice , which is rooted in a 
more extensive network, through which issues of national identity, having a place and qualities 
are tended to be explained and addressed. Citizenship can be guaranteed through Acts of 
citizenship 11 that raise doubt about the law . Overall, citizenship as legal status matters and 
policies, which evacuate citizenship gives a sign of what constitutes the idea of citizenship 
and nationhood  (Isin, 2009, pp. 368 370). 
According to Anderson (2013), two events explain citizenship in a contemporary sense. First, 
to be part of only one nation nowadays is questionable because of the globalization and 
internationalization of the modern societies. Second, resources are scarce, because of the 
increased number of people not living in their state but around the world. Therefore, an equal 
allocation of resources today is almost impossible, and inequality is unavoidable. Additionally, 
                                                 
11 This theoretical concept was created by Isin Engin. In his book he introduces the concept not only that it is a 
legal status but that it also includes several practices such as social, cultural political and symbolic. Having a 
citizenship formally is not the same as having substantive citizenship which encompasses the above-mentioned 




the concept of citizenship was revived after various changes that took place in the social 
structure of European societies. Moreover, after the end of the Cold War the questions were 
raised about nationalism, political identity, and citizenship. In addition, because of the global 
refugee crisis, a new problem of stateless persons happened. Finally, the creation of the 
European Community also caused problems about the citizenship status, regarding migrant 
labor, minorities and all forms of the transient. In the modern state, citizenship is not limited to 
share starting points and origins, yet it covers shared values . While the idea of civic 
citizenship holds out the potential for a more comprehensive national identity, if compared 
with ethnic citizenship, it still makes new normative limits of rejection caused by the failure of 
people to share the same values. He also states that it builds a chain of importance in which 
the formal equality of legal citizenship is burrowed out by the making of the order that draws a 
qualification between the good, tolerated and failed citizen  (Anderson, 2013, pp. 5 7). 
Having that in mind, Brubaker described German s ethnicity as always already existing  
ethnic identity, which compared to French is relatively new. While comparing these two 
nationalisms is of a practical nature, he concluded that Germany makes it harder than France 
does for immigrants to attain citizenship (Brubaker, 1992). Also, in the introduction of his 
book Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America, Brubaker 
(1989) noted that Germany had longer history in defining the notions of citizenship and 
nationality rather than the UK. According to Smith s theory, the national identity must be 
analyzed by relating it both with the type of nation and with the way how it was formed. 
3.2.1 German citizenship regulations and immigration policies 
Germany is an exception regarding the way it defines common citizenship because it defines it 
by common ethnicity. During the 19th century, or the period when Europe was under imperial 
subjection, the Poles and Baltic peoples under the Russian yoke, the Croats under the 
Hapsburgs  looked to the German ideal of ethnic nationalism when articulating their right to 
self-determination  (Ignatieff, 1995, p. 5). Defined as a possible threat to the society in several 
anti-immigrant discourses, were the immigrants. In the countries that later become 
incorporated into the German Reich, the ius soli principle was the condition for citizenship. 
Citizenship status got the ones who were born on German soil and people who got police 
permission after they resided in Germany a certain period. In 1818, in Prussia it was possible to 




Napoleon. However, Prussia changed that provision in 1842, when it was introduced the 
principle of ius sanguinis (Piper, 1997, p. 95).  
The growing trend of European integration attracted scholars  attention to citizenship rights 
and integration of the immigrants of European countries. The comparative analysis of Rogers 
Brubaker of Germany and France shows that the legal definition for citizenship of one state 
reflects its cultural influence of nationhood. Brubaker explains that German understanding of 
nationhood has been Volk-centered or differential type of nationhood, instead of being 
assimilationist as was the case with France, which contradicts with the analysis made by 
Koopmans and Statham (2003, p. 74), where was stated that Germany has the Ethno-cultural 
assimilationism ideal-typical national model and France has the Civic assimilationism ideal-
typical national model. Volksgemeinschaft , which means people s community , refers to 
the organic, linguistic and racial community (Brubaker, 2009, pp. 1 10). In addition, Brubaker 
states that the nationhood in Germany is ethnocultural and differential. That is a result of the 
remarkably opened citizenship to ethnic German immigrants from the Soviet Union and from 
Eastern Europe, as opposed to the closed citizenship to immigrants with non-German origin. 
Further, German people identified their state as an ethnocultural frontier between Slavs and 
Germans. In both directions, much assimilation of Germans and Slavs happened on these 
borders. German restrictive citizenry toward non-German immigrants and expansive towards 
ethnic German immigrants reflected the ethno cultural aspect in the self-understanding of this 
country (Brubaker, 2009, pp. 10 15). The ethno cultural exclusionist citizenship of Germany 
allows immigrants to access the labor market but do not incorporate them into the political 
community (Koopmans and Statham, 1999, p. 660).   
The German Nationality Law of 1913 allowed only one way of acquiring citizenship, which 
was through the birth to a citizen. To understand why the law remained after 1945 one must 
investigate Germany s Stunde Null  (Zero Hour). The Citizenship Act before 1993 was a 
product of the needs of the early years of the Federal Republic, as well as a product of many 
modern German social arrangements (Gesley, 2017). Two reasons motivated the decision to 
hold the 1913 law and insert the following definition in Article 116 of the Basic Law: the 
adoption of the German constitution during Forced Displacement  when followed expelling 
about 12 million Germans from the territories east of the line Oder-Neisse to Poland and 




the Federal Republic. Maintaining the ethnic concept of citizenship was a way of the Federal 
Republic to support the claim that the nation-state belongs to all Germans. That concept 
legitimized the passport of the East Germans who managed to cross the Berlin Wall. The 
divided nation was one of the key obstacles to the liberalization of the right to nationality 
before unification, which blocked many reform proposals (ibid.). 
However, Germany reformed its law on nationality several times, but another measure covered 
the arrival of the guest workers, outside the framework of this law. In 1977, the Federal 
Interior Minister published guidelines for naturalization that contained the following rather 
restrictive conditions: The composition of the German population is constantly changing, due 
to the following two reasons: German people live long and usually have a few children, and 
Germany is the main destination country for immigration in the European Union. As a result, 
the German identity, the future of its welfare state and integration of immigrants, are one of the 
major concerns of the German government. Above all, Germany has a long-established self-
perception as a non-immigration county , which makes this situation even more difficult 
(Gesley, 2017). 
Additionally, as a response to the persecution of the Nazi era, a particularly generous asylum 
provisions where included in the Basic Law of Western Germany, which even exceeded the 
provisions provided by the 1951 Geneva Convention. Respectively, even though most 
applications of asylum-seekers were not recognized, still Western Germany provided the right 
to remain in the country on a humanitarian base. After the unification of the country, the 
number of asylum-seekers was growing more and more, with over 1.2 million applications 
between 1990 and 1993, which made Germany the most preferred destination for asylum in the 
EU. Gesley states that Germany was ahead of its time, providing enormous social and 
economic rights, while at the same time omitting the political rights of migrants and guest 
workers. Germany acted very differently to other European immigration countries such as the 
UK and France: whereas those countries had relatively liberal citizenship laws, Germany, on 
the other hand had restrictive citizenship provisions, in terms of naturalization at birth and as 
an adult. The most important reason for this is historical, in response to the first full law on 
citizenship, in 1913 at the time of imperial Germany. In that document, the nationhood was 
ethnically defined, which was expected for the period when the law was passed, but it is 




(Gesley, 2017). Until 2000, Germany had no ius soli provision for the children of foreigners 
born on the territory of Germany to be able to gain citizenship automatically at birth. 
Consequently, immigrants  take-up of German citizenship has been consistently low in that 
period. Therefore, in German terms, that means to talk about non-nationals, not of immigrants 
(Gesley, 2017). Germany is the most significant destination country for immigrants within the 
EU. According to Bericht, around 5.5% of the populations are Turkish immigrants or 101.061 
of the registered foreign residents in 2012 had Turkish nationality (Bericht, 2011). 
From the historical point of view, the immigration has a very sensitive response in Germany. 
Moreover, only Germany from the entire EU has political asylum filled with a moral 
importance. The history of immigration to Germany begins after 1945. However, in the period 
from the 19th Century to the end of the Second World War an emigration country was the 
referral of Germany; German citizens mainly migrated in the United States searching for better 
opportunities. After the arrival of the refugees in the Allied zones of occupation, most of them 
ended up in the Western part of Germany. Even though they were German citizens, their 
arrival generated social tension. It resulted in a formation of a political party that successfully 
defended the interest of the German refugees. Concretely, Konrad Adenauer allowed different 
levels of assistance for the disadvantaged group in the society (Bericht, 2011). 
On the other hand, after 1955 Germany faced with the labor shortage in the industrial and 
agricultural sector. The manual and risk jobs were not desirable for Germans, which paved the 
way for so-called Gastarbeiter (guest workers) (Kogan, 2003, p. 1). By 1973, the year when 
the end of recruitment took place, 5.7 % of the German population was not of German origin. 
Opposite to the expectations of the political leaders, the end of the recruitment changed the 
perception of the guest workers towards Germany. Instead of perceiving Germany as a place to 
work for a short time and return home, they were encouraged to immigrate to Germany. 
Family migration followed the permanent settlement, which resulted not in reducing the 
number of migrants, but the opposite happened (Rudolph, 1996, pp. 288 290).  
From the political perspective, the immigration policy was formulated to achieve the result of a 
reduction in the number of immigrants, but that did the opposite. Germany is not a country of 
immigration  was the statement that every government of Germany used until 1998 when the 
Green (German Green Party) -SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) government started 




expectancy in Germany has risen over the decades. At the same time, birth rate in Germany has 
increased between 2012 and 2016 but it is still below the level needed to provide a stable 
population. It has increased from 8 to almost 10 births per 1.000 people, or it is returning to the 
EU average. As mentioned, Germany has been one of the EU s most desired destinations for 
immigration, as shown by the refugee surge in 2015 and 2016 (Germany Country Report, 
2018).  
Additionally, fertility rate of Germany is one of the lowest in the EU. According to Eurostat 
data, in Germany in 2016 lower total fertility than the EU-28 average was recorded (Eurostat, 
2016). The effect of the above-mentioned elements on Germany s welfare system is enormous. 
Also, the German economy had a problem with severe shortages of labor in several areas, 
including lower-skilled branches and high-skilled sectors. Thus, an initial response to this 
problem was provided recently, when it was announced the limited working scheme for highly 
skilled migrants (Green, Hough, Alister, and Graham, 2008, pp.  93 111). 
3.2.2 Regulations on citizenship in the United Kingdom and immigration policies 
Having in mind that the UK is a multinational state, including the Welsh, Northern Irish, 
Scottish and English nations, most of the British citizens have dual identities (Heath and Tilley, 
2005, p. 121). Indeed, the citizenship model of Britain is a type of multicultural and pluralist 
citizenship, where the incorporation of the immigrants is not just in the labor market but also in 
the public sphere, or they have equal social and political rights while preserving immigrant s 
cultural difference (Koopmans and Statham, 1999, p. 662). Heath and Tilley (2005) focused on 
the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards immigration in UK. They used 
data from the 2003 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and made three distinctions 
of British people: a) British who believe that both civic and ethnic conceptions are important, 
b) British that believe that just civic conceptions are important and c) British who think that 
neither of these conceptions are valid (Heath and Tilley, 2005, p. 119). Scholars linked these 
three groups with the age of participants of ISSP, which showed that the younger the 
respondent, the more they tend to be favorable towards multiculturalism. Therefore, Heath and 
Tilley (2005, p. 119) conclude that it is to expect a gradual change of the UK s national 
identity towards a civic only . They concluded that the UK is not welcoming to immigrants, 




immigrants. Still, British people appear to be more tolerant of the immigrants after their arrival 
compared to their tolerance before immigrants  arrival (Heath and Tilley, 2005, p. 131).  
A codified ius soli regulation was established even before the Norman invasion in 1066 
(Dummett and Nicol, 1990). The ius sanguinis principle was imposed for the English successor 
to the throne with the intention of enabling members of the Royal family that were born abroad 
to become a queen or a king. Still the traditional law was very vague, thus, immediately after 
the Second World War, in 1948, the British Nationality Act was introduced which was a 
response to rising of nationalism in many Commonwealth countries. After that the shift from 
imperial Britain to national Britain was formally initiated (Goulbourne, 1991). The British 
Nationality Act formally established both, a) the principle of ius soli or citizenship based on a 
birth on the territory of the UK and its colonies, and b) the principle of ius sanguinis. Within 
this act four different British subject  categories were created: Citizens of the UK and 
Colonies, Citizens of independent Commonwealth countries, British Protected Persons, and the 
Irish (Bos, 1993, p. 629). Therefore, the common practice of gaining citizenship by birth was 
now alongside with the acquisition of citizenship by descent. However, constant immigration 
in the Commonwealth was restricted by several modifications towards implicit ius sanguinis in 
1962. The following restriction was added: only those whose parents or grandparents were 
born in the UK could enter without restrictions. Thus, even after the British Nationality Act of 
1981 the tendency towards ius sanguinis has reached strong consolidation with which the ius 
sanguinis principle was reaffirmed (Bos, 1993, p. 630). The tendency towards linking 
citizenship with nationality and henceforth, towards involving an ethnic definition of 
Britishness by preventing the entry of people from non-white Commonwealth countries was 
historically developed, judging by the provisions made in 1948, 1962, 1971 and 1981 (Piper, 
1997, p. 94). Unlike Germany, the British state supported the political participation and the 
migrant organization in the 2000s, especially at the local level. Britain supported the race 
relations industries and local bodies that ensured equal treatment specifically in the labor 
market. These bodies reported any discrimination provided by anti-discrimination law and the 
authority of the Commission for Racial Equality. The whole treatment was due to the fear of 
race rebellions that could have happened similarly to the ones in the United States (Koopmans 




Citizenship is not just a sort of relationship between the state and an individual, but also a 
national identity and belonging constituent. Marshall (1949) focused on citizenship and the 
social class in the UK. He made a specific finding for the UK case, dividing British citizenship 
into three separate parts: civil, political and social. The first one or the civil part of citizenship 
consists the freedom rights, which include freedom of speech, thought and faith, liberty of 
person, the right to justice and the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts. Thus, 
the courts of justice are the institutions that directly relate with above-mentioned civil rights. 
The following compose the political part of citizenship: direct and indirect participation in the 
exercise of political power, to which the Parliament and the Council of the local government 
are corresponding institutions. The last part of the social element of citizenship includes a 
whole range of rights, starting from living the life of a civilized being while following the 
rules, to the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security. Most closely connected 
institutions with the social element of citizenship are the social services and the educational 
system (Marshall, 1949, pp. 10 11).  
In the past, once granted citizenship meant that the citizen would have it until they asked for a 
different one. Moreover, the UK has been a leader of increasing the state s power to remove 
citizenship (Isin, 2009, pp. 368 370). The policy developments of citizenship analyzed here 
recommend that the locus of state security concern and its control has stretched out, from the 
physical spaces policed by the state to the limits of nationality and citizenship (Pattie, Syed and 
Whiteley, 2004). The regulation of citizenship in the UK has changed in the past decade. 
Namely, the citizenship deprivation has increased its power over individuals who are 
suspicious of being involved in terrorism (Choudhury, 2017, p. 224). Equal citizenship eroded 
and existed hierarchy among British citizens because of the recent changes in citizenship 
policies. Introducing the new policy regulations regarding citizenship occurred as a response to 
the war on terror . Radicalized terrorist suspect and citizenship deprivation and its 
deployment have blurred the borderline between social and security policies. Choosing security 
over equality and going back to the colonial way of governing through a radicalized notion of 
social order, changed the approach to the concept of citizenship from a protected right to an 
acceptable behavior award (Choudhury, 2017, p. 226). 
Both above analyzed counties, Germany and the UK, have experienced a similar immigration 




from the 1950s until the 1970s. After that, immigration flows were restrictive, and the controls 
started being implemented. The main difference between Germany and the UK is that the 
former produces an immigration policy that assumed the immigrated labor force as guests, not 
as part of Germany, and the latter assumed the opposite. Germany created a special policy 
called a guest worker, which allowed many workers from Europe getting employment in 
Germany but ensuring that they would eventually return to their homes. Thus, this policy 
reduced the social and civil integration of these workers to a minimum. According to Soysal 
(1994, p. 3), Germany implemented integration of guest workers as persons, not as citizens, 
based on a global human rights regime, not of national norms and legal discourse. On the other 
hand, Britain allowed migrants to become subjects of the UK, and by 1971, they automatically 
gained equal political and social rights. This is because Britain after 1965 formally took 
measures against counter-racism and discrimination and began to promote social integration 
and social inclusion (Koopmans and Statham, 2003, pp. 207 216). Britain allowed its 
immigrants to become part of its society and part of the British Commonwealth who 
automatically received equal social and political rights until 1971 (Koopmans and Statham, 
1999, p. 665).  
3.3 Immigration policies  
Given that this thesis begins with the assumption that facilitating immigration regulation 
increases the inflow of regular migrants and it might influence on reducing negative attitudes 
towards immigration, it is important to give some insights of immigrants  access to citizenship 
and how it influences on immigrant integration in Germany and in the UK respectively. 
As it was previously said, I will briefly elaborate on the first part of immigration policy theory 
i.e. immigration control policy which focuses on the admission and selection of immigrants 
and on combating illegal immigration. Immigration control policy regulates the entrance 
conditions and provisions which immigrants should meet to successfully enter the borders of 
the desired country. However, I will also elaborate on the second part of immigration policy 
which focuses on the conditions that the receiving country provides to foreign citizens, i.e. the 




3.3.1 Immigration policy of Germany 
In the Nationality Act of 22 July 1913, which was lastly amended on 11 October 2016, one can 
find citizenship provisions, nationalization requirements and general regulations regarding 
German citizenship requirements. According to Section 3 of the Nationality Act, German 
citizenship can be acquired in five different ways: a.) by birth, b.) by a declaration for children 
born before 1 July 1993, c.) by adoption as a child, d.) by issuance of the certificate pursuant to 
Section 15 (1) or (2) of the Federal Expellees Act, e.) Germans without German citizenship, 
under special procedure lay down in Section 40a of the Nationality Act, and f.) For a foreigner 
by Naturalization (Nationality Act, 2016, Section 3). In the recent years, Germany has 
experienced rising levels of incoming migration of foreign nationals. In 2009, immigration of 
foreign nationals was around 267,000, while net migration of foreign nationals was around 
101,000. In 2015, immigration had increased to 1.46 million, with net migration of foreign 
nationals rising to 1.22 million. It cut down in 2016 to arrival of 919,000 and net migration of 
611,000, or almost a half of the previous year s figure (Strurge, 2018, p. 23).  
For this thesis, I will elaborate only on the final way of acquisition of citizenship, i.e. for a 
foreigner by naturalization. Naturalization means that a foreigner living a certain period as 
permanent resident of Germany, can become German citizen. Section 8 of the above-
mentioned Act provides further information how a foreigner can become a German citizen. 
According to this section, a foreigner may be naturalized upon request if they fulfill all the 
following conditions: a.) have legal capacity or has a legal representative, b.) have not been 
sentenced for an unlawful act and are not subject to any court order imposing a measure of 
reform and prevention due to a lack of criminal capacity, c.) have a residence and d.) Can 
support themselves and their children. Additionally, permanent residents have to meet the 
following requirements: a.) lived in Germany on a residence permit for at least 8 years, or 7 
years and attended an integration course, b.) prove at least B1 German language proficiency, 
c.) be financially able to support themselves and their family without the state help, d.) be law-
abiding citizens with no criminal record, e.) pass a citizenship test and f.) Renounce any 
previous citizenship. Acquiring German citizenship gives certain opportunities: the right to 
vote, the right of free movement, the right of consular protection, the right of assembly and 
association, unrestricted job opportunities, and the right to become a civil servant (Germany-




that Germany has resembling citizenship regime to the EU-1512 counties with some exceptions. 
What is exceptional for Germany is its dual citizenship policy. To be concise, immigrants  
children who have both foreign and German citizenship must choose between the two 
citizenships no later than the age of majority.13 If they fail to meet this condition, after the age 
of 23 they will automatically lose German citizenship. Turkish population living in Germany 
face this legal obstacle most often, since the Turkish people are the most exposed to this due to 
their large numbers in Germany. Also, German naturalization is slightly more restrictive given 
the fact that the language requirement i.e. B1 German language requirement which is perceived 
as a big challenge, especially for refugees. However, Germany s bureaucratic difficulties are 
fewer compared to EU-15 countries (Tjaden, 2013a, p. 23). 
3.3.2 Immigration policy of United Kingdom 
A closer look at the citizenship law indicators of the UK suggests that British citizenship can 
be acquired after commencement (acquisition by birth or adoption, acquisition by descent, 
acquisition by registration, acquisition by naturalization), special cases (right to registration by 
virtue of residence in UK or relevant employment, registration by virtue of marriage, virtue of 
father s citizenship of UK) (British Nationality Act, 1981, p. 1). By the same token, 
immigrants that are allowed to become British citizens can apply via different ways based on 
their background and life circumstances. According to the government webpage gov.uk 
(British citizenship, 2018) eligible immigrants to apply for citizenship are the following: they 
moved to the UK on a visa, they are from European Economic Area (EEA), they have lived in 
the UK for the last five years and had indefinite leave to remain for the last 12 months or they 
have lived in the UK for the last five years and are from EEA and had permanent residence 
status for the last 12 months. As a matter of fact, if someone s spouse or civil partner is a 
British citizen, they can apply if they have lived in the UK for the last three years and have 
indefinite leave to remain and a permanent residence document (only for those from the EEA). 
                                                 
12 EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (EU member states from 1995 to 2004). 




Considering the information about dual citizenship or dual nationality on the official home 
office web page (Dual citizenship, 2018), it is allowed in the UK and one does not need to 
apply for it. Moreover, it is stated by the same source that there will be no change to the rights 
and status of EU citizens living in the UK until 2021 (ibid.).  
One should mention that in July 2016, people of the UK on a referendum decided to leave the 
EU.14 However, the UK remains a member of the EU until the conclusion of its negotiations 
with the EU under the Article 50. Thus, citizens coming from EU and EEA counties and 
Switzerland have the right to work in the UK under the EU regulation. They can as well bring 
their families with them, however the conditions are to not rely on UK  public funds, to pay 
income tax and to provide evidence that their income is above the tax-free minimum (Smith, 
2018). 
The UK has slightly more inclusive citizenship regime compared to the rest EU countries 
(Tjaden 2013b, p. 21). The uniqueness of its regime is the special naturalization procedure with 
several demanding requirements. It is particularly evident after the recent changes that were 
made, such as higher language requirements, followed by funding cuts for language courses 
(English as a second or foreign language - ESOL). Moreover, the UK has exclusive 
naturalization procedure compared to the most EU counties (Tjaden 2013b, p. 21). The 
procedure is discretionary and high naturalization fees are required by the naturalization 
seekers. To be concrete, the application fee for a single applicant is £756 and the fee amounts 
even to £1.134 for civil partners or spouses applying together (Wray, 2013, p. 8). 
3.4 Analysis of immigration policies of Germany and United Kingdom 
There are major differences between these two countries in the way they incorporate migrants 
into political life, which is appropriate to the type of their citizenship attribution. In the 
                                                 
14 After the Brexit, tectonic political transformations occurred. The leave EU vote was being boosted by the 
opposition with the anti-immigrant notion and Syrian refugee crisis reinforcing the support for nativism and 
national identity. Immigration-based anxieties and national sovereignty arguments intensified support for the 





political process in Germany, migrants play a marginal role. This is partly because they are 
exempt from the possibility of having formal citizenship, and because Germany has maintained 
a policy of excluding migrants from political participation. Migrants in Germany do not have 
an institutional way of engaging in the political process, except for local-level councils of 
marginal significance.  In addition, there is no institutional way for minorities in Germany to 
seek the formulation of an official ethnic minority, racial equality or anti-discrimination policy 
(Koopmans and Statham, 2003, pp. 210 212)  
According to the Eurostat database (2016), Germany reported the largest total number of 
immigrants (1.5 million) in 2015, followed by the United Kingdom (631.500). In absolute 
terms, the largest numbers of non-nationals living in the EU Member States on 1 January 2016 
were found in Germany (8.7 million persons), followed by the UK (5.6 million). Among the 
next highest levels of acquisition of citizenship in 2015 were in the UK (118.000) and in 
Germany (110.100).  
Table 3.1: Total number of acquisitions of citizenship in the EU-28, Germany and UK, 
from 2009 to 2015 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EU-28 771.8 815.1 785.5 821.6 981.6 889.1 841.2 
Germany 96.1 104.6 109.6 114.6 111.9 110.6 110.1 
United Kingdom 203.6 194.8 177.6 193.9 207.5 125.6 118.0 
 Source: Eurostat Database (2016). 
According to the analysis made by the Migration Policy Group in coordination with the 
Heinrich-Boell-Foundation edited by Tjaden (2013a, 2013b), 43% of foreign born immigrants 
have acquired citizenship in Germany and compared with the UK case where 35% of 
immigrants born outside the UK became citizens.  
If we compare the both countries concerning the average years needed for acquisition of 
citizenship of foreign born immigrants, then immigrants in Germany need on average 9,5 years 
which comparing to the UK case is one year more, as in the UK it takes 8,5 years to acquire a 
citizenship status. The determinants that influence of the time needed to become a citizen are 




well as family status and employment, and gender (Tjaden, 2013a). In the next part, I will 
analyze each of these determinants separately.  
Regarding residence, in the German case, the percentage of naturalized population is around 
the EU average given the fact that its population is based on a long-settled first generation. On 
the other hand, in the UK case one of the explanations why the share of acquired citizenships is 
around the EU mean is because it has relatively large percentage of newcomers among the 
foreign-born immigrants although it already has deep-rooted immigration groups (ibid.). 
Considering immigrants  background, the country of origin plays one of the main roles in 
explaining the duration of time needed to become a citizen in both countries. The main 
difference between the analyzed countries in this manner is that a different profile of 
immigrants is attracted to migrating to Germany than to the UK. In the UK, immigrants from 
highly-developed countries are attracted as opposed to Germany in which immigrants that 
originate from low or medium developed counties are addressed. Immigrants who originate 
from non-EU countries are more likely to get citizenship compared to those who have left the 
EU in the UK and in Germany. Additionally, in the case of the UK, the difference between EU 
and non-EU applicants for citizenship is even 33 percent, or 12 percent were originating from 
EU, and 45 percent had origin from outside the EU. The same difference in Germany is only 
4.5 percent, or 40 percent of the new citizens had EU origin, and 44 percent had non-EU 
origin. I can thus conclude that naturalization rates of citizens that have EU origins are low 
because they must give up their old citizenship to gain German citizenship. On the other hand, 
in the UK of there is a possibility for immigrants having both British and another nationality 
(only if that is permitted by the other state of nationality), and there are also a lot of permanent 
residents in the UK who are only citizens of the EU (Sawyer and Wray, 2014, p. 9).  
In the context of the theoretical framework of this dissertation, it can be argued that the UK as 
a civic national identity state has more restrictions regarding citizenship acquisition but allows 
double citizenship. While Germany as an ethnic national identity state has less restrictive 
citizenship procedure than the UK but at the same time applies these rules more exclusively 





4 Research Methodology 
 
This chapter gives methodological explanation that seeks to determine how the immigration 
attitudes in Germany and the UK are correlated with their age, education and being born in the 
country. Creating a very probable connection between the ethnic or civic national identity and 
the shift in immigration-related attitudes requires further data collection and analysis. This 
thesis uses data from the European Social Survey (ESS) Round Seven, Second Edition (2014) 
which is an academically-driven social survey designed to chart and explain the interaction 
between Europe s changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns of its 
diverse populations. I use a special part of the survey where the immigration attitudes are 
included and demonstrate how identity and immigration perceptions are correlated. 
 
4.1 Methods and Research Model 
The following sub-chapter has the purpose of describing the methods that will be used in this 
thesis. Also, this section introduces the used methodology which deals with nationalism and 
immigration-related threat perceptions, for which qualitative approach and quantitative 
research are used. To be concrete, the used qualitative methods are: conceptualization and 
historical development analysis as well as primary (legislative acts, government publications, 
research data and records of organizations), academic books and scientific journals in social 
science. and secondary sources analysis and interpretation. Additionally, the quantitative 
methods (cross tabulation and analysis of variance) are used to elaborate the aggregated 
indicators of the attitudes toward immigration. In the quantitative analysis I focus on the 
following elements of similarity or difference of immigration-related threat perceptions in the 
UK and German: do citizens of Germany and the UK have similar or different attitudes 
towards immigrants regarding the realistic, symbolic, social threats and contact with out-group 
members. Also, I analyze the similarity or difference between age and education of the citizens 




To investigate the immigration-related threat perceptions, the rate of attitudes towards 
immigration was examined through four distinct dimensions: realistic threat, security threat, 
symbolic threat and contact with out-group members.  
Table 4.1: Model for quantitative research: dependent variable 
Perceived threats caused by immigrants 
Realistic Threat Variables: 
1. Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs (Answer on a scale of 0 to 10, 0 is 
equivalent to Take away jobs  and 10 is equivalent to Create new jobs .) 
2. Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less (Answer on a scale of 
0 to 10, 0 is equivalent to Generally take out more  and 10 is equivalent to Generally 
put in more .) 
3. Immigration bad or good for country's economy (Answer on a scale of 0 to 10, 0 is 
equivalent to Bad for the economy  and 10 is equivalent to Good for the economy .) 
Symbolic Threat Variables:  
4. Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrant (Answer on a scale of 0 to 10, 
0 is equivalent to Cultural life undermined  and 10 is equivalent to Cultural life 
enriched .)  
5. Religious beliefs and practices undermined or enriched by immigrants (Answer on a scale 
of 0 to 10, 0 is equivalent to Religious beliefs and practices undermined  and 10 is 
equivalent to Religious beliefs and practices enriched .)  
Social Threat Variable: 
6. Immigrants make county worse or better place to live (Answer on a scale of 0 to 10, 0 is 
equivalent to Worse place to live  and 10 is equivalent to Better place to live .) 
 
Contact with out-group members Variables: 
7. Contact with different ethnic group: how bad or good (Answer on a scale of 0 to 10, 0 is 
equivalent to Extremely bad  and 10 is equivalent to Extremely good .) 
8. People of minority race/ethnic group in current living area (Almost nobody minority 
race/ethnic group  1, some minority race/ethnic group -2, Many minority race/ethnic 
group  3). 
9. Different race or ethnic group: contact (verbal and non-verbal), how often (Never - 1, Less 
than once a month  2, Once a month -3, Several times a month  4, Once a week  5, 
Several times a week  6, Every day  7.) 
10. Different race or ethnic group: have any close friends (Yes, several  1, Yes, a few  2, No, 




 The key independent variables of research are the following: age, education and born in 
country. Subsequently, this research used another set of independent variables and fused an 
index of conditions for allowing immigrants into the country , composed of several items. 
Those items include various qualifications for immigration: good educational qualifications, 
speaking country s official language, having Christian background, being white, having work 
skills needed in the country and being committed to the way of life in the country. 
Table 4.2: Model for quantitative research: independent variable 
Civic and ethnic national identity  
Demographic variables 
1. Born in country (Yes  1, No  2)   
 
2. Age (1-18 years  1, 18-35 years  2, 35-45 years  3, 46-60 years  4, +60  5) 
 
3. Education (Low level  1 and 2, Medium level  3 and 4, High level  5 and 6) 
Qualification for immigration  
1. Good educational qualifications (Extremely unimportant  0, Extremely important  10) 
 
2. Speak country s official language (Extremely unimportant  0, Extremely important  
10) 
 
3. Christian background (Extremely unimportant  0, Extremely important  10) 
 
4. Be white (Extremely unimportant  0, Extremely important  10) 
 
5. Work skills needed in the country (Extremely unimportant  0, Extremely important  
10) 
6. Committed to the way of life in the country (Extremely unimportant  0, Extremely 
important  10) 
4. 2 Research findings  
The analysis starts with the tests made in both countries regarding the conditions for allowing 
immigrants into the country. My initial results suggest that significant differences between 
the countries are evident. On qualification for immigration: good educational qualifications, 
Germans (M = 6.77, SD = 2.602) were significantly more tolerant than the British (M = 6.96, 
SD = 2.265). On qualification for immigration: speak country s official language, Germans 




2.113). On qualification for immigration: Christian background, Germans (M = 1.96, SD = 
2.526) were significantly more tolerant than the British (M = 2.91, SD = 2.956). On 
qualification for immigration: be white, Germans (M = 0.82, SD = 2.688) were significantly 
more tolerant than the British (M = 1.74, SD = 2.475). On qualification for immigration: work 
skills needed in country, Germans (M = 6.35, SD = 2.688) were significantly more tolerant 
than the British (M = 7.56, SD = 2.291). On qualification for immigration: committed to way 
of life in country, Germans (M = 7.75, SD = 2.165) were significantly more tolerant than the 
British (M = 7.94, SD = 2.184). 
In short, I can infer that levels of perceived threat and negative attitudes are different in the UK 
and Germany, considering these results. Thus, to get better conclusions, I make more 
comprehensive analysis that follows below. In the four succeeding subsections I elaborate on 
how the research variables are correlated. Namely, how respondents  age, born in country and 
education are associated with the immigration-related threat perceptions. In the first sub-
section it is elaborated on the realistic threat in the second about the symbolic threat, in the 
third about the social threat and in the final about the contact with out-group members. 
4.2.1 Realistic threat 
In this subsection I elaborate on how respondents  age, born in country and education are 
associated with the realistic threat variables: a.) immigrants take jobs away in country or create 
jobs, b.) taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less and c.) 
Immigration bad or good for country s economy) 
A one-way between subjects  analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to compare the 
effect on the attitudes towards immigrants about if they take away jobs in country or create 
new jobs reveals an insignificant main effect for realistic threat perceptions and age of 
respondent in the case of Germany (F (4, 2966) = 0.963, p < 0.427). 
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the means across the age 
categories (F 4, 2196) = 4.038, p < 0.003), (F 4, 2166) = 3.555, p < 0.007) and (F 4, 2208) = 
7.920, p < 0.000) with a significant interaction with the realistic threat variables: immigrants 
about if they take away jobs in country or create new jobs, Taxes and services: immigrants take 




respectively. In contrast to the German case, we found a consistent significant effect of the 
age of respondents with their realistic threat perceptions. Mainly, the older the 
participants are the more negative attitudes towards immigrants they have. 
In the German case, the ANOVA reveals an insignificant interaction effect between the age of 
respondent and Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less (F (4, 
2926) = 0.251 p < 0.909), and insignificant interaction between age of respondent and 
immigration is bad or good for country s economy (F (4, 2982) = 0.345, p < 0.848). 
Considering mean differences, I found that it is not a significant difference between the 
means across the age categories. 
In the German case, one-way analysis of variance on educational background of respondents 
reveals significant main effect on the three realistic threat variables mentioned above. 
Namely, significant interaction effect between the educational background of respondent and 
the attitudes towards immigrants about if they take away jobs in country or create new jobs (F 
(5, 2974) = 28.492, p < 0.000), the effect on taxes and services: immigrants take out more than 
they put in or less and the educational background of respondent is significant too i.e. (F (5, 
2929) = 24.970, p < 0.000). Moreover, significant interaction between educational background 
of respondent and immigration is bad or good for country s economy (F (5, 2992) = 62.750, p 
< 0.000). That is, those who are more educated were significantly less likely to feel threatened 
by immigrants.  
In the UK case, the one-way analysis of variance on educational background of respondents 
reveals significant main effect on the three realistic threat variables mentioned above. 
Namely, significant interaction effect between the educational background of respondent and 
their attitudes towards immigrants about if they take away jobs in country or create new jobs (F 
(5, 2214) = 21.869, p < 0.000), the effect on taxes and services: immigrants take out more than 
they put in or less and the educational background of respondent is significant too i.e. (F (5, 
2183) = 29.779, p < 0.000). Moreover, significant interaction between educational background 
of respondent and immigration is bad or good for country s economy (F (5, 2226) = 43.940, p 
< 0.000).  
A one-way ANOVA on respondents born in Germany revealed a significant main effect for 




jobs in country or create new jobs the effect was significant (F (1, 2978) = 17.952, p < 0.000). 
The ANOVA model on respondents born in Germany predicts a similar outcome for the 
variable taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less (F (1, 2933) = 
12.294, p < 0.000), whereas the effect on respondents born in Germany was insignificant 
regarding the variable immigration is bad or good for country s economy (F (1, 2995) = 0.023, 
p < 0.878). That means, those who are not born in Germany were significantly less likely to 
feel threatened by immigrants. 
A one-way ANOVA on respondents born in the United Kingdom revealed a significant 
main effect for all realistic threat variables. For the first variable i.e., immigrants take away 
jobs in country or create new jobs the effect was significant (F (1, 2218) = 63.559, p < 0.000) 
The ANOVA model on respondents born in Germany predicts a similar outcome for the 
variable taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less (F (1, 2187) = 
80.261, p < 0.000), whereas the effect on respondents born in Germany  was insignificant 
regarding the variable immigration is bad or good for country s economy (F (1, 2230) = 
110.356, p < 0.000). 
4.2.2 Symbolic threat 
In the following subsection we will elaborate on the effect of the respondents  age, born in 
country and education was observed concerning the attitudes towards immigrants i.e. the 
symbolic threat (variables: a.) Country s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants 
and b.) Religious beliefs and practices undermined or enriched by immigrants. 
One-way analysis of variance on age of respondents of Germany reveals significant main 
effect on all symbolic threat variables mentioned above. Namely, significant interaction 
effect between the age of respondent and the variable country s cultural life undermined or 
enriched by immigrants was revealed (F (4, 3000) = 5.985, p < 0.000). Moreover, significant 
interaction between age of respondent and religious beliefs and practices undermined or 
enriched by immigrants was confirmed (F (4, 2931) = 6.952, p < 0.000). 
One-way analysis of variance on age of respondents of the United Kingdom reveals 
significant main effect on all symbolic threat variables. Precisely, significant interaction 




enriched by immigrants was revealed (F (4, 2196) = 13.804, p < 0.000). Moreover, significant 
interaction between age of respondent and religious beliefs and practices undermined or 
enriched by immigrants was confirmed (F (4, 2130) = 10.317, p < 0.000). 
German case: A one-way ANOVA on educational background of respondents revealed a 
significant main effect for all symbolic threat variables. For the first variable i.e., country s 
cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants was revealed the effect was significant (F 
(5,3009) = 47.774, p < 0.000). The ANOVA model on educational background of respondents 
predicts a similar outcome for the variable religious beliefs and practices undermined or 
enriched (F (5, 2939) = 15.426, p < 0.000). 
UK case: A one-way between subjects  ANOVA revealed significant educational 
background of respondents  effects (F 5,2214) = 43.038, p < 0.000) and (5,2147) = 15.504, p 
< 0.000) with a significant interaction with the symbolic threat variables: country s cultural life 
undermined or enriched by immigrants and religious beliefs and practices undermined or 
enriched respectively. Mainly, the more educated UK citizens were significantly less likely to 
feel threatened by immigrants compared with less educated ones. 
A one-way between subjects  ANOVA revealed that whether someone is born in Germany or 
not has insignificant effects on symbolic threat variables (F 1, 3012) = 1.349, p < 0.246) 
and (F 1,2943) = 2.067, p < 0.151) country s cultural life undermined or enriched by 
immigrants and religious beliefs and practices undermined or enriched respectively.  
A one-way ANOVA on respondents born in the United Kingdom revealed a significant 
main effect for all symbolic threat variables. For the first variable i.e., country s cultural life 
undermined or enriched by immigrants the effect on born in the UK was significant (F (1,2218) 
= 77.519, p < 0.000). The ANOVA model on respondents born in the UK predicts a similar 
outcome for the variable religious beliefs and practices undermined or enriched (F (1, 2151) = 
105.840, p < 0.000). In contrast to the UK case, we found a consistent insignificant effect 
of the born in Germany respondents with their symbolic threat perceptions. That means,  





4.2.3 Social threat  
Our results suggest that there are significant differences between Germany and the UK in terms 
of the social threat variable. Germans, on immigrants make county worse or better place to live 
(M=5.34; SD=2.270) were significantly more tolerant on immigrants than the British (M=4.74; 
SD=2.567).  
4.2.4 Contact with out-group members 
In this subsection we will elaborate on the effect of the respondents  age, born in country and 
education was observed concerning the contact with out-group members variables: a.) people 
of minority race/ethnic group in current living area, b.) different race or ethnic group: contact, 
how often, c.) different race or ethnic group: have any close friends, d.) different race or ethnic 
group: contact, how bad or good.  
To find a relationship between ordinal variables, we used Chi-Square Tests. To calculate these 
tests, we used cross-tabs which showed the frequencies of the variables  joint occurrences.  
The Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the Pearson Chi-Square is less than .05, i.e. it is 0.000 which 
means that there is a relationship between Germans age and people of minority race/ethnic 
group in the current living area. The Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the Pearson Chi-Square is less 
than .05, i.e. it is 0.000 which means that there is a relationship between age of respondent of 
Germany and different race or ethnic group: contact, how often. The Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for 
the Pearson Chi-Square is less than .05, i.e. it is 0.000 which means that there is a 
relationship between age of respondent of Germany and different race or ethnic group: have 
any close friends. A one-way between subjects  analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted 
to compare the effect on different race or ethnic group: contact, how bad or good and age of 
respondent. In the German case (F (4, 2753) = 2.979, p < 0.018). The ANOVA reveals a 
significant interaction effect between the age of respondent and different race or ethnic 
group: contact, how bad or good 
As for the UK case, the Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the Pearson Chi-Square is less than .05, i.e. 
it is 0.000 which means that there is a relationship between British age and people of 
minority race/ethnic group in the current living area. The Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the Pearson 




age of respondent of the UK and different race or ethnic group: contact, how often. The 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the Pearson Chi-Square is less than .05, i.e. it is 0.000 which means 
that there is a relationship between age of respondent of the UK and different race or ethnic 
group: have any close friends. A one-way between subjects  analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was conducted to compare the effect on different race or ethnic group: contact, how bad or 
good and age of respondent. As opposed to the German case in the British case (F (4, 2087) = 
1060, p < 0.375) the ANOVA reveals an insignificant interaction effect between the age of 
respondent and contact, how bad or good and age of respondent. 
If we start by Germany, the Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the Pearson Chi-Square is less than .05, 
i.e. it is 0.000 which means that there is a relationship between educational background of 
respondent of Germany and people of minority race/ethnic group in the current living area. The 
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the Pearson Chi-Square is less than .05, i.e. it is 0.000 which means 
that there is a relationship between educational background of respondent of Germany and 
different race or ethnic group: contact, how often. The Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the Pearson 
Chi-Square is less than .05, i.e. it is 0.000 which means that there is a relationship between 
educational background of respondent of Germany and different race or ethnic group: have 
any close friends. The ANOVA reveals a significant interaction effect between the 
educational background of respondent and different race or ethnic group: contact, how bad or 
good (F (5, 2759) = 5.083, p < 0.000).  
The UK results show that the Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the Pearson Chi-Square is less than 
.05, i.e. it is 0.022 which means that there is a relationship between educational background 
of respondent of the UK and people of minority race/ethnic group in the current living area.  
The Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the Pearson Chi-Square is less than .05, i.e. it is 0.000 which 
means that there is a relationship between educational background of respondent of the UK 
and different race or ethnic group: contact, how often. The Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the 
Pearson Chi-Square is less than .05, i.e. it is 0.000 which means that there is a relationship 
between educational background of respondent of the UK and different race or ethnic group: 
have any close friends.  
The ANOVA reveals a significant interaction effect between the educational background of 





The results of Germany show that the Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the Pearson Chi-Square is less 
than .05, i.e. it is 0.000 which means that there is a relationship between Germans born in the 
country and people of minority race/ethnic group in the current living area. The Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) for the Pearson Chi-Square is less than .05, i.e. it is 0.001 which means that there is a  
relationship between Germans born in the country and different race or ethnic group: contact, 
how often. The Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the Pearson Chi-Square is less than .05, i.e. it is 
0.000 which means that there is a relationship between German born in the country and 
different race or ethnic group: have any close friends. Finally, the ANOVA reveals a 
significant interaction effect between the respondents born in a country and different race or 
ethnic group: contact, how bad or good (F (1,2763) = 4510, p < 0.034). 
In the case of UK, the Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the Pearson Chi-Square is less than .05, i.e. it 
is 0.001 which means that there is a relationship between British born in the country and 
people of minority race/ethnic group in the current living area. The Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for 
the Pearson Chi-Square is less than .05, i.e. it is 0.001 which means that there is a 
relationship between British born in the country and different race or ethnic group: contact, 
how often. The Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) for the Pearson Chi-Square is less than .05, i.e. it is 
0.000 which means that there is a relationship between British born in the country and 
different race or ethnic group: have any close friends. Finally, the ANOVA reveals a 
significant interaction effect between the respondents born in a country and different race or 











5 Conclusion  
 
The thesis has examined people s attitudes towards immigration, aiming to relate them to 
people s civic or ethnic national identification in the cases of Germany and the UK. The 
starting point of the analysis was the probability of correlation between the two variables, 
namely the perceived threats towards immigrants was expected to correlate with the civic and 
ethnic national identity. The findings of the dissertation suggest that the correlation is not 
linear, i.e. the rate of perceived threats towards immigrants tends to go below the mean in the 
civic national state (the UK) and the rate of perceived threats towards immigrants tends to go 
above the average in the ethnic nationality state (Germany), which disapproves the first and 
the second hypotheses.  
When put in theoretical context, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination as interrelated 
components of antagonistic intergroup relations are not as much present in the country that 
was introduced as ethnic national identity state compared to the civic national identity state. 
Moreover, the evidence given in this thesis points toward the idea that legal immigration has 
increased after some changes in the immigration policies of Germany and the UK.  It can be 
argued that the UK as a civic national identity state has more restrictions regarding citizenship 
acquisition, while Germany as an ethnic national identity state has less restrictive citizenship 
requirements. Threat Perception in Germany compared with the British one gave different 
results. I have found that for the UK case, the older the participant is the more negative 
attitudes towards immigrants will have, which is not the case in Germany. However, in the 
both countries less educated respondents have more negative attitudes toward immigrants and 
also citizens have more negative attitudes compared to the non-citizens. When focusing on the 
Symbolic Threat Perception, those who are not born in Germany significantly less likely felt 
threatened by immigrants. When we turn our attention to the Social Threat Perception, the 
results suggest that there are significant differences in the variables when immigrants make a 
country a worse or a better place to live in. Germans were significantly more tolerant of 
immigrants than the British. 
The findings obtained from the quantitative analysis suggest that the concept of civic and 
ethnic national identity should be reconsidered. Having in mind these new empirical findings, 




favourable approach to immigrants compared to the UK. To sum up, Germans were 
significantly more tolerant than the British regarding these variables: qualification for 
immigration; good educational qualifications; speaking the country s official language; 
Christian background; white racial qualification; work skills needed in the country; and 
committed to a certain way of living in the country.  The findings have proven that 
older citizens in the UK have a more negative approach to immigrants regarding realistic 
threats, so I propose an increase of the awareness of this age group regarding the importance 
of immigration and the positive aspects it brings to a society. I suggest policy makers in both 
counties should advocate against the creation of exclusively immigrant districts in their cities, 
because that way the negative immigration-related threat perception increases due to the rise 
of a symbolic threat. 
 The empirical results show several things about the four conceptions of nationalism. 
According to primordial nationalism scholars, nation-building is based on ethnicity and 
nationalists are loyal to the nation not to the state (Anbarani, 2013, p. 64). This approach is 
slightly more related to the UK, compared to Germany. The constructivist nationalism is 
premised on the assumption that the nation is a social construct and it is an entity made on the 
premise of social interaction. This theory gives a modern definition of how a national identity 
is created, therefore this approach fits understanding immigration policy and attitudes in both 
states. According to perennial nationalism, nations are not natural and primordial, instead, 
they are immemorial or timeless and perennial or eternal (Seton-Watson, 1977, pp. 16 19). 
This approach is very abstract, and it cannot be related to the national identification of both 
counties in modern terms. Finally, the ethnosymbolism suggests that the cultural sources of 
modern nations make a huge impact on the creation of nations, as well as the sense of ethnic 
identity, which is crucial for its formation. This approach gives a definition which is still 
relevant to both counties, especially for the UK, given that the results showed that the cultural 
and religious life is undermined by immigrants. 
 This research recommends several scientific directions for further research. First, it is 
of great importance to distinguish immigrants according to their country of origin, ethnicity, 
religion etc., to get a better understanding about which group of people in the host country has 
the most negative or positive attitudes towards immigration. Second, future research is needed 
to identify the factors that lead to negative attitudes towards immigration and particularly 
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povzamem, Nemci so bili veliko bolj tolerantni kot Britanci glede naslednjih spremenljivk: 
d  
skupine o pomembnosti mi
g  
zan z Veliko Britanijo v 
socialni konstrukt in je entiteta narejena na osnovi socialne interakcije. Ta teorija daje moderno 
definicijo temu, kako je nacionalna definicija ustvarjena, zato ta pristop ustreza razumevanju 
abstrakten 
Etnosimbolizem poudarja, da imajo kulturni viri modernih narodov ogromen vpliv na 
oda. 
Britanijo, glede na to, da so rezultati pokazali, da so migrant spodkopali kulturno in religiozno 
 
 daljnje raziskave. Kot prvo, je zelo 







1. Anbarani, A., (2013). Nation, Nationalism in Controversial Debates and Thought: A 
Review of Origin of Nation and Nationalism. Canadian Social Science 9 (3), 61 67. 
2. Anderson, B., (1983). Imagined Communities, London: Verso.   
3. Anderson, B., (2013). Us and Them, The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
4. Antony, H. and James R. T., (2005). British National Identity and Attitudes towards 
Immigration, International Journal on Multicultural Societies 7(2), 119 132. 
5. Bauer, T. K., Lofstrom. M., and Zimmermann. K., (2000). Immigration Policy, 
Assimilation of Immigrants and Natives' Sentiments towards Immigrants: Evidence 
from 12 OECD-Countries, IZA Discussion paper series. 
6. Berry, J. W., (2008). Globalization and acculturation, International Journal of 
Intercultural Relations 32(1), 328 336. 
7. BMI (2017)., Jedes Alter zahlt. Eine demografiepolitische Bilanz der Bundesregierung 
zum Ende der 18, Legislaturperiode, Berlin. 
8. Bobo, D. L., (1999). Prejudice as Group Position: Micro foundations of a Sociological 
Approach to Racism and Race Relations, Journal of Social Issues,55(3), 445 472. 
9. Bos, M., (1993). Ethnisierung des Rechts Staatsburgerschaft in Deutschland, 
Frankreich, Grossbritannien und den USA. Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie, 45(4),619 643.  
10. British Nationality Act 1982, Chapter 61, Available from 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61/pdfs/ukpga_19810061_en.pdf  
11. Brubaker, R. W. (2009). Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, Harvard 
University Press. 
12. Bryan, S. T., (1993). Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship. In Turner. 
S. Bryan (Ed.) Citizenship and Social Theory, London, U.K., SAGE. 
13. Callens, M., Meuleman, B., Valentova, M., (2015). Perceived Threat Contact and 





14. Choudhury, T., (2017). The radicalization of citizenship deprivation. Critical Social 
Policy 37(2), 225 244. 
15. Cohen, R., (1994). East-West and European migration in a global context. New 
Community, 18(1), 9 26. 
16. Cooper, M., (2016) Secular stagnation: The fear of a non-reproductive future. 
Postmodern Culture 27(1), 1 24. 
17. Country Reports Germany, (2018). Country Risk IHS Markit. Available from 
http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=10&sid=ab021497-f89e-
4a08-820b-4f59dbc05230%40sessionmgr4009  
18. Dummett, A. and Nicol, A., (1990). Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others: Nationality 
and Immigration Law. Law in context. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
19. Encyclopædia Britannica, Guelf and Ghibelline 2017  
https://www.britannica.com/event/Guelf-and-Ghibelline 
20. Esses, V. M., Dovidio, J., Jackson, L. A. and Armstrong. T. L. (2001). The 
immigration dilemma: the role of perceived group competition, ethnic prejudice, and 
national identity. Journal of Social Issues 57(3), 389 412. Available from 
https://spssi.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/0022-4537.00220  
21. Esses, V. M., Ulrich W., Carina W., Matthias P. and Christopher J. W., (2006). 
Perceptions of national identity and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, 
Canada and Germany International Journal of Intercultural Relations 30(6), :653
669. 
22. Eurobarometer 89, (2018). European Commission Public Opinion. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail
/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2180 
23. European Commission Public Opinion. (2016). Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDet
ail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2137   
24. Eurostat. (2016). Fertility statistics. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Fertility_statistics  
25. Eurostat. (2017a). Immigration by age, sex and broad group of citizenship Available 
from 




26. Eurostat. (2017b). Migration and migrant population statistics. Available from  
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics 
27. Finkel, Matt., (2016). Theories of Nationalism: A Brief Comparison of Realist and 
Constructivist Ideas of the Nation. Available from 
http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=1460  
28. G20 global displacement and migration trends report. (2017). OECD, Available 
fromhttps://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/G20-OECD-migration.pdf  
29. Gellner, E., (1964). Thought and Change. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
30. Gellner, E., (1974). Contemporary Thought and Politics. Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Ltd.  
31. Gellner, E., (1983). Nations and nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Available from http://books.google.com/books?id=E8YPAQAAMAAJ  
32. German Citizenship, (2018). Available from: http://www.germany-visa.org/german-
citizenship/ 
33. German Missions in the United States, (2018). Available from 
http://www.germany.info/Vertretung/usa/en/05__Legal/02__Directory__Services/02_
_Citizenship/Citizenship__Obtain.html 
34. Gesley. J., (2017). Germany: The Development of Migration and Citizenship Law in 
Post-war Germany The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Centre. 
Available from https://www.loc.gov/law/help/migration-citizenship/germany.php  
35. Gilroy, P., (1987). There Ain t No Black in the Union Jack: The cultural politics of 
race and nation. London: Hutchinson. 
36. Gonzalez, K. V., Verkuyten, M., Weesie, J., & Poppe, E., (2008). Prejudice towards 
Muslims in The Netherlands: Testing integrated threat theory. Available from 
https://www.rug.nl/research/portal/files/2706988/VelascoGonzalezK-Prejudice-
2008.pdf  
37. Goulbourne, H., (1993). Aspects of Nationalism and Black Identities in Post Imperial 
Britain. In Cross, M. & Keith, M. (Eds.), Racism, the City and the State. London: 
Routledge.  





39. Green. S., Hough. D., Alister. M., and Graham T., (2008). The Politics of the New 
Germany, London: Routledge. 
40. Heath F., Anthony and Tilley R., James., (2005). British National Identity and 
Attitudes towards Immigration. Available from 
www.unesco.org/shs/ijms/vol7/issue2/art2 
41. Heath, A. F. and Roberts J., (2008). British Identity: its sources and possible 
implications for civic attitudes and behavior. Research report for Lord Goldsmith s 
Citizenship Review. Available from 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/docs/british-
identity.pdf  
42. Henninger A, Wimbauer. C., and Dombrowski. R., (2008) Demography as a push 
toward gender equality? Current reforms of German family policy. Social Politics: 
International Studies in Gender, State & Society 15(3), 287 314.  
43. Hobsbawm, E. J., (1992). Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, 
reality. Cambridge England: Cambridge University Press. 
44. Holley E. Hansen and Vicki L. Hesli., (2009). National Identity: Civic, Ethnic, 
Hybrid, and Atomized Individuals. Europe-Asia Studies 61(1), 1 28. 
45. Hronová, T., (2015). Impact of the Economic Crisis on Immigration Policy: Case 
Study of Great Britain, master s thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences Praha. 
46. Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D., eds. (2000). Nationalism: critical concepts in 
political science. Critical concepts in political science. Routledge, London. 
47. Ignatieff, M. (1995). From blood and belonging, Farrar, Straus and Giroux.  
48. Isin, E. F., (2009). Citizenship in flux: The figure of the activist citizen. Subjectivity 
29(1), 367 388. 
49. Isin, E. F., Nielsen, G. M., (2008). Acts of Citizenship, Ney York: Zed Books. 
50. Jenkins, R., (2008). Social Identity, Third edition Routledge.  
51. Joppke, Christian. Ewa, M., (Eds.) Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants 
in Liberal Nation-States, New York Palgrave Macmillan. 
52. Kohn, H., (1946). The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background, 
New York, Macmillan. 
53. Kohn, H. (1950). Romanticism and the Rise of German Nationalism. The Review of 




54. Kohn, H., (1968). Age of Nationalism: First Era of Global History, Joanna Cotler 
Books; New edition. 




56. Koopmans, R, and Paul S., (1999). Challenging the Liberal Nation State Post 
nationalism, Multiculturalism, and the Collective Claims Making of Migrants and 
Ethnic Minorities in Britain and Germany. American Journal of Sociology 105 (3), 
652 96. 
57. Koopmans, R. and Paul S., (Eds.) (2000). Challenging Immigration and Ethnic 
Relations Politics: Comparative European Perspectives. New York, Oxford 
University Press. 
58. Koopmans, R. and Paul S. (2003). How National Citizenship Shapes 
Transnationalism, New York Palgrave Macmillan. Available from 
http://www.persee.fr/doc/remi_0765-0752_2001_num_17_2_1779#remi_0765-
0752_2001_num_17_2_T1_0073_0000  
59. Kuhnel, S. and Leibold J. (2004). The Others and We: Relationships Between 
Germans and Non-Germans from the Point of View of Foreigners Living in Germany  
In book Germans or Foreigners? Attitudes toward Ethnic Minorities in Post-
Reunification Germany edited by Alba Richard, Peter Schimdt and Martina Wasmer. 
Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies Series. 
60. Lamont, M, and Virág M. (2002). The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences. 
Annual Review of Sociology 28(1), 167 95. Available from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3069239   
61. Lovec, M. and Bojinovic, F. A., (2016). National stereotypes as a co-determinant of 
bilateral relations: The case of the Western Balkans, Teorija in praksa 53(5), 1109
1123. 
62. Maddens, B., Jaak B., and Roeland B. (2000). National identity and the attitude 
towards foreigners in multi-national states: The case of Belgium, Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies 26(1), 45 60. 





64. Matera, C., Cristina S., and Brown, R. (2015). Majority minority acculturation 
preferences concordance as an antecedent of attitudes towards immigrants: The 
mediating role of perceived symbolic threat and meta stereotypes. International 
Journal of Intercultural Relations 45(1), 96 103. 
65. McConachay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the Modern Racism 
Scale. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism. 
San Diego, CA, US: Academic Press. 
66. McLaren L. (2016). Immigration, national identity and political trust in European 
democracies Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 43(3), 379 399. 
67. Messerschmidt R (2017) Demographic change as dystopia: Contemporary German 
discourse on ageing, between science and politics, Abingdon: Routledge. 
68. Meyers, E. (2000). Theories of International Immigration Policy-A Comparative 
Analysis. The International Migration Review, 34(4), 1245 1282. Available from 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2675981  
69. Mommsen, H. (1983). History and National Identity: The Case of Germany, German 
Studies Review 6(3), 559 82. 
70. Murphy, M., (2017) The Economization of Life. Durham and London: Duke 
University Press. 
71. Nationality Act of 22 July 1913 (Reich Law Gazette I p. 583 - Federal Law Gazette III 
102-1), as last amended by Article 3 of the First Act to Amend the Federal Act on 
Registration and other legislation of 11 October 2016 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 2218) 
Available from https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_rustag/englisch_rustag.html  
72. Natter, K. (2018). Rethinking immigration policy theory beyond Western liberal 
democracies.  Comparative Migration Studies, 6(1), 1 25. Available from 
http://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-018-0071-9  
73. Nundoochan, S. (2018). Shades of whiteness: immigration and the role of British 
newspapers before the EU referendum, Open Democracy, Available from 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/sonali-nundoochan/shades-of-whiteness-
immigration-and-role-of-british-newspapers-before-eu-referendu  
74. OECD Family database (2016). OECD - Social Policy Division - Directorate of 





75. Official online page of the UK government, British Citizenship, Available from 
https://www.gov.uk/british-citizenship  
76. Official online page of the UK government, Dual Citizenship, Available from 
https://www.gov.uk/dual-citizenship  
77. Oxford Dictionaries, s. v. emigration,  Available from 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/emigration  
78. Pattie. C., Syed. P., and Whiteley, P., (2004). Citizenship in Britain: Values, 
Participation and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
79. Pichastor, P., J. M., Muñoz-Rojas, D., Invernizzi Gamba, F., & Mugny, G. (2004). 
Perceived in-group threat as a factor moderating the influence of in-group norms on 
discrimination against foreigners. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34(2), 135
153. Available from http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:15771  
80. Piper, N., (1997). Racism, nationalism and citizenship: a comparative analysis of 
Britain and Germany, University of Sheffield PhD Thesis. Available from 
http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/14713/  
81. Qualitative comparative analysis. (2018). A Dictionary of 
Sociology.  Encyclopedia.com http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-
sciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/qualitative-comparative-
analysis 
82. Quillian, L., (1995). Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: Population 
composition and anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe. American 
Sociological Review, 60(4), 586 611. 
83. Ragin, C., (1987). The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies. University of California Press. Available from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pnx57  
84. Rapoport, A., (1955). Comments on "The Comparative Method in the Social 
Sciences". Philosophy of Science, 22(2), 118 122.  
Available from http://www.jstor.org.nukweb.nuk.uni-lj.si/stable/185547   
85. Reich Law Gazette I p. 583 - Federal Law Gazette III 102-1. 
86. Repo, J., (2016) Gender equality as biopolitical governmentality in a neoliberal 
European Union. Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 




87. Riek, B. M., Mania, E.W. & Gaertner, S.L. (2006). Intergroup threat and outgroup 
attitudes: a Meta analytic review, Personality and Social Psychology Review 10(4), 
336 53. 
88. Rinehart, W. J., (1963). The Meaning of Stereotypes, Theory into Practice Taylor & 
Francis, 3(2), 136 143. Available from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1475640  
89. Rosen, B. C., (1984). Review: Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social 
Psychology, American Journal of Sociology 90(1), 209 11. Available from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2779342    
90. Rudolph, H., (1996). The new gastarbeiter system in Germany, Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 22(2), 287 300. Available from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.1996.9976539  




92. Schnapper, D. (1994). The Debate on Immigration and the Crisis of National Identity. 
West European Politics, 17(2), 127 139. 
93. Schultz S (2015) Reproducing the nation: the new German population policy and the 
concept of demographization. In: Distinction. Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 
16(3), 337 361. 
94. Schultz, S., (2018). Demographic futurity: How statistical assumption politics shape 
immigration policy rationales in Germany, Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0263775818772580  
95. Shulman, S., (2004). The contours of civic and ethnic national identification in 
Ukraine. Available from https://doi.org/10.1080/0966813032000161437 
96. Smith, A. D. (1991). National Identity Penguin Books London. Available from 
https://books.google.si/books?id=bEAJbHBlXR8C&lpg=PR7&ots=fLrNVic9Mg&dq
=national%20identity&lr&hl=sl&pg=PR4#v=onepage&q=national%20identity&f=fal
se      
97. Smith, A. D. (1992). National Identity and the Idea of European Unity. International 
Affairs 68 (1), 55 76. 





99. Soysal, Y. N. (1994). Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post national Membership 
in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
100. Stephan, W.  G., Ybarra, O., Martinez, C.  M., Schwarzwald, J.and Tur-Kaspa, 
M. (1998). Prejudice toward immigrants to Spain and Israel: An Integrated Threat 
Theory Analysis, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,29(4),559 576. 
101. Stephan. G. and Renfro, C.L. (2003). The role of threat in intergroup relations. 
New York: Psychology Press. 
102. Stephen, S. (2004). The contours of civic and ethnic national identification in 
Ukraine, Europe-Asia Studies, Available from 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0966813032000161437?scroll=top&ne
edAccess=true   
103. Sturge, G., (2018). Migration Statistics, House of commons Library Briefing 
Paper. Available from 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06077/SN06077.pdf  
104. Swenson, A., (2018). Historic preservation, the state and nationalism in Britain, 
Nations and Nationalism 24 (1), 43 63. Available from 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/nana.12373  
105. Terwey, M. (2004). Ethnocentrism in Germany: Worldview Connections and 
Social Contexts  In Book Germans or Foreigners? Attitudes Toward Ethnic Minorities 
in Post-Reunification Germany edited by Alba Richard, Peter Schimdt and Martina 
Wasmer. Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies Series. 
106. Tjaden, D. J., (2013a). ACIT Access to Citizenship and its impact on immigrant 
integration, Handbook for Germany, Migration Policy Group. 
107. Tjaden, D. J., (2013b). ACIT Access to Citizenship and its impact on immigrant 
integration, Handbook for the United Kingdom, Migration Policy Group. 
108. The British Nationality Acts, (2017). Available from 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachme
nt_data/file/632297/britnatacts.pdf   
109. United Kingdom Country Review (2018). Country Watch. 






111. Wasmer, M. and Koch, A., (2004). Foreigners as Second-Class Citizens? 
Attitudes toward Equal Civil Rights for Non-Germans  In Book Germans or 
Foreigners? Attitudes toward Ethnic Minorities in Post-Reunification Germany edited 
by Alba Richard, Peter Schimdt and Martina Wasmer 95 119. Europe in Transition: 
The NYU European Studies Series. 
112. Wray, H., (2013). Naturalization Procedures for Immigrants United Kingdom, 
EUDO Citizenship Observatory. Available from 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29802/NPR_2013_32-
UK.pdf?sequence=1  
113. Zimmermann, A., (2015). Demographic change on the political agenda of the 
European Commission. Berlin, Population Europe Discussion Paper 2. 
114. Zhuojun, W., and Hualing. He., (2014). National Identity in the Era of 
Globalization: Crisis and Reconstruction, Social Sciences in China 35(2), 139 154. 















Annex A: Empirical results of the thesis 
Realistic Threats * Age of participant 
 
Table A. 1: Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs * Age of participant 
Age Mean N Std. Dev Germany United Kingdom 
1 - 18 years Mean 
5,6 4,16 
  N 
104 45 
  Std. Deviation 
1,893 2,43 
18 - 31 years Mean 
5,64 4,48 
  N 
462 287 
  Std. Deviation 
2,082 2,595 
31 - 45 years Mean 
5,63 5 
  N 
598 536 
  Std. Deviation 
2,088 2,353 
46 - 60 years Mean 
5,51 4,57 
  N 
891 549 
  Std. Deviation 
2,021 2,342 
61 + years Mean 
5,46 4,64 
  N 
916 784 










Table A. 2: Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs 
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups (Combined) 16,246 4 4,061 0,963 0,427 
Within groups 12515,118 2966 4,22     
Total 12531,364 2970       
Table A. 3: Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs 
United Kingdom Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 87,839 4 21,96 4,038 0,003 
Within groups 11942,774 2196 5,438     
Total 12030,612 2200       
 
Table A. 4: Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less * Age 
Age Mean N Std. Dev Germany United Kingdom 
1 - 18 years Mean 4,95 4,65 
  N 98 43 
  Std. Deviation 1,665 2,256 
18 - 31 years Mean 4,87 4,68 
  N 459 281 
  Std. Deviation 2,003 2,549 
31 - 45 years Mean 4,86 4,83 
  N 591 527 
  Std. Deviation 2,096 2,461 
46 - 60 years Mean 4,86 4,32 
  N 877 539 
  Std. Deviation 2,114 2,448 
61 + years Mean 4,79 4,45 
  N 900 781 
  Std. Deviation 2,014 2,264 
Total Mean 4,85 4,54 
  N 2925 2171 







Table A. 5: Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less 
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups (Combined) 4,212 4 1,053 0,251 0,909 
Within groups 12255,865 2920 4,197     
Total 12260,077 2924       
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups (Combined) 81,668 4 20,417 3,555 0,007 
Within groups 12439,141 2166       
 
Table A. 6: Immigration bad or good for country's economy * Age 
Age Mean N Std. Dev Germany United Kingdom 
1 - 18 years Mean 5,78 5,09 
  N 102 45 
  Std. Deviation 2,037 2,076 
18 - 31 years Mean 5,66 5,06 
  N 462 288 
  Std. Deviation 2,316 2,726 
31 - 45 years Mean 5,8 5,22 
  N 601 537 
  Std. Deviation 2,425 2,535 
46 - 60 years Mean 5,8 4,62 
  N 896 551 
  Std. Deviation 2,384 2,539 
61 + years Mean 5,75 4,52 
  N 926 792 
  Std. Deviation 2,25 2,398 
Total Mean 5,76 4,8 
  N 2987 2213 
  Std. Deviation 2,329 2,521 
Table A. 7: Immigration bad or good for country's economy 
Germany Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 7,495 4 1,874 0,345 0,848 
Within groups 16188,788 2982 5,429     





Table A. 8: Immigration bad or good for country's economy 
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 198,903 4 49,726 7,92 0 
Within groups 13862,615 2208 6,278     
Total 14061,517 2212       
Realistic Threats * Education 
Table A. 9: Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs * Education 
Education Mean N Std. Dev Germany United Kingdom 
1 Low Mean 4,84 4,2 
  N 56 480 
  Std. Deviation 2,246 2,601 
2 Low Mean 4,97 4,19 
  N 300 292 
  Std. Deviation 2,213 2,369 
3 Medium Mean 5,23 4,49 
  N 1301 463 
  Std. Deviation 2,089 2,322 
4 Medium Mean 5,76 4,66 
  N 240 74 
  Std. Deviation 1,974 2,109 
5 High Mean 5,82 4,6 
  N 352 289 
  Std. Deviation 1,993 2,2 
6 High Mean 6,17 5,46 
  N 731 622 
  Std. Deviation 1,783 2,028 
Total Mean 5,54 4,68 
  N 2980 2220 
  Std. Deviation 2,06 2,346 
 
Table A. 10: Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs * Education 
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 577,749 5 115,55 28,492 0 
Within groups 12061,19 2974 4,056     




Table A. 11: Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs * Education 
 
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 574,741 5 114,948 21,869 0 
Within groups 11637,464 2214 5,256     
Total 12212,205 2219       
 
Table A. 12: Taxes and services: immigrants take out more/less than they put in * Edu 
Education Mean N Std. Dev Germany United Kingdom 
1 Low Mean 4,61 4,18 
  N 51 471 
  Std. Deviation 2,04 2,477 
2 Low Mean 4,36 4,05 
  N 296 285 
  Std. Deviation 2,179 2,33 
3 Medium Mean 4,53 4,24 
  N 1275 458 
  Std. Deviation 2,021 2,379 
4 Medium Mean 4,97 4,38 
  N 240 74 
  Std. Deviation 1,889 2,605 
5 High Mean 5,04 4,13 
  N 349 288 
  Std. Deviation 1,982 2,206 
6 High Mean 5,47 5,52 
  N 724 613 
  Std. Deviation 1,974 2,209 
Total Mean 4,84 4,55 
  N 2935 2189 
  Std. Deviation 2,052 2,41 
 
Table A. 13: Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less * Edu 
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 505,116 5 101,023 24,97 0 
Within groups 11850,212 2929 4,046     





Table A. 14: Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less * Edu 
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 811,159 5 114,948 29,779 0 
Within groups 11892,513 2183 5,448     
Total 12703,672 2188       
Table A. 15: Immigration bad or good for country's economy * Education 
Education Mean N Std. Dev Germany United Kingdom 
1 Low Mean 5,38 3,96 
  N 52 484 
  Std. Deviation 2,529 2,566 
2 Low Mean 4,99 4,39 
  N 306 294 
  Std. Deviation 2,383 2,397 
3 Medium Mean 5,21 4,42 
  N 1305 463 
  Std. Deviation 2,321 2,491 
4 Medium Mean 5,98 4,66 
  N 243 76 
  Std. Deviation 2,192 2,107 
5 High Mean 5,99 4,79 
  N 354 287 
  Std. Deviation 2,255 2,402 
6 High Mean 6,88 5,94 
  N 738 628 
  Std. Deviation 1,933 2,281 
Total Mean 5,76 4,8 
  N 2998 2232 
  Std. Deviation 2,336 2,528 
Table A. 16: Immigration bad or good for country's economy * Education 
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 1551,769 5 310,354 62,75 0 
Within groups 14798,015 2992 4,946     
Total 16349,784 2997       
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 1280,54 5 256,108 43,94 0 
Within groups 12974,34 2226 5,829     




Realistic Threats * Born in country 
 
Table A. 17: Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs * Born in country 
Born in country Mean N Std. Dev Germany United Kingdom 
Yes Mean 5,48 4,52 
  N 2692 1914 
  Std. Deviation 2,024 2,307 
No Mean 6,02 5,66 
  N 288 306 
  Std. Deviation 2,313 2,352 
Total Mean 5,54 4,68 
  N 2980 2220 
  Std. Deviation 2,06 2,346 
 
Table A. 18: Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs * Born in country 
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 75,734 1 75,734 17,952 0 
Within groups 12563,205 2978 4,219     
Total 12638,94 2979       
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 340,206 1 340,206 63,559 0 
Within groups 11871,999 2218 5,353     
Total 12212,205 2219       
 
Table A. 19: Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less * 
Born  
Born in country Mean N Std. Dev Germany United Kingdom 
Yes Mean 4,8 4,37 
  N 2652 1899 
  Std. Deviation 2,06 2,381 
No Mean 5,25 5,71 
  N 283 290 
  Std. Deviation 1,93 2,27 
Total Mean 4,84 4,55 




  Std. Deviation 2,052 2,41 
Table A. 20: Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less * 
Born  
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 51,571 1 51,571 12,294 0 
Within groups 12303,758 2933 4,195     
Total 12355,329 2934       
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 449,711 1 449,711 80,261 0 
Within groups 12253,961 2187 5,603     
Total 12703,672 2188       
 
Table A. 21: Immigration bad or good for country's economy * Born in country 
Born in country Mean N Std. Dev Germany United Kingdom 
Yes Mean 5,75 4,58 
  N 2705 1929 
  Std. Deviation 2,326 2,502 
No Mean 5,77 6,18 
  N 292 303 
  Std. Deviation 2,418 2,242 
Total Mean 5,75 4,8 
  N 2997 2232 
  Std. Deviation 2,335 2,528 
 
Table A. 22: Immigration bad or good for country's economy * Born in country 
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 0,128 1 0,128 0,023 0,878 
Within groups 16331,635 2995 5,453     
Total 16331,762 2996       
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 672,168 1 672,168 110,356 0 








        Symbolic threats * Age 
 
Table A. 23: Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants * Age 
Age Mean N Std. Dev Germany United Kingdom 
1 - 18 years Mean 6,23 5,6 
  N 106 42 
  Std. Deviation 2,103 2,22 
18 - 31 years Mean 6,25 5,36 
  N 469 283 
  Std. Deviation 2,448 2,753 
31 - 45 years Mean 6,21 5,5 
  N 603 538 
  Std. Deviation 2,504 2,667 
46 - 60 years Mean 6,46 4,76 
  N 901 550 
  Std. Deviation 2,345 2,73 
61 + years Mean 5,92 4,52 
  N 926 788 
  Std. Deviation 2,337 2,593 
Total Mean 6,2 4,95 
  N 3005 2201 
  Std. Deviation 2,392 2,691 
 
Table A. 24: Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants * Age 
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 136,051 4 34,013 5,985 0 
Within groups 17047,741 3000 5,683     
Total 17183,792 3004       
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 390,814 4 97,704 13,804 0 
Within groups 15543,281 2196 7,078     





Table A. 25: Religiuos beliefs and practices undermined or enriched by immigrants * Age 
Age Mean N Std. Dev Germany United Kingdom 
1 - 18 years Mean 5,69 5,05 
  N 105 41 
  Std. Deviation 1,706 1,816 
18 - 31 years Mean 5,44 4,8 
  N 459 268 
  Std. Deviation 1,985 2,314 
31 - 45 years Mean 5,18 4,74 
  N 590 527 
  Std. Deviation 2,097 2,307 
46 - 60 years Mean 5,36 4,27 
  N 877 535 
  Std. Deviation 2,027 2,298 
61 + years Mean 4,97 4,07 
  N 905 764 
  Std. Deviation 2,128 2,229 
Total Mean 5,23 4,39 
  N 2936 2135 





Table A. 26: Religiuos beliefs and practices undermined or enriched by immigrants * Age 
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 117,554 4 29,389 6,952 0 
Within groups 12391,179 2931 4,228     
Total 12508,733 2935       
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 212,579 4 53,145 10,317 0 
Within groups 10971,564 2130 5,151     




Symbolic threats * Education 
Table A. 27: Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants * Education 
Education Stolpec1 Germany United Kingdom 
1 Low Mean 5,59 4,1 
  N 56 468 
  Std. Deviation 2,613 2,694 
2 Low Mean 5,46 4,33 
  N 308 289 
  Std. Deviation 2,501 2,477 
3 Medium Mean 5,71 4,68 
  N 1311 464 
  Std. Deviation 2,4 4,661 
4 Medium Mean 6,78 4,72 
  N 243 76 
  Std. Deviation 2,136 2,392 
5 High Mean 6,29 4,83 
  N 355 291 
  Std. Deviation 2,299 2,64 
6 High Mean 7,16 6,16 
  N 742 632 
  Std. Deviation 2,095 2,444 
Total Mean 6,2 4,95 
  N 3015 2220 
  Std. Deviation 2,399 2,692 
 
Table A. 28: Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants * Education 
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 1275,476 5 255,095 47,774 0 
Within groups 16067,068 3009 5,34     
Total 17342,544 3014       
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 1424,282 5 284,856 43,038 0 
Within groups 14653,752 2214 6,619     




Table A. 29: Religiuos beliefs and practices undermined or enriched by immigrants * 
Edu 
Education Mean N Std. Deviation Germany United Kingdom 
1 Low Mean 5,35 4,1 
  N 55 443 
  Std. Deviation 1,888 2,403 
2 Low Mean 4,84 4,17 
  N 298 285 
  Std. Deviation 2,107 2,344 
3 Medium Mean 5,01 4,13 
  N 1281 455 
  Std. Deviation 2,048 2,275 
4 Medium Mean 5,32 4,16 
  N 237 73 
  Std. Deviation 1,877 2,041 
5 High Mean 5,12 4,14 
  N 350 284 
  Std. Deviation 1,986 2,214 
6 High Mean 5,77 5,08 
  N 724 613 
  Std. Deviation 2,099 2,125 
Total Mean 5,22 4,4 
  N 2945 2153 




Table A. 30:Religiuos beliefs and practices undermined or enriched by immigrants * Edu 
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 322,071 5 64,414 15,426 0 
Within groups 12272,138 2939 4,176     
Total 12594,209 2944       
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 394,062 5 78,812 15,504 0 
Within groups 10913,803 2147 5,083     




      Symbolic threats * Born in country 
Table A. 31: Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants * Born  
Born in country Mean, N, Std. Dev. Germany United Kingdom 
Yes Mean 6,18 4,75 
  N 2722 1914 
  Std. Deviation 2,39 2,678 
No Mean 6,35 6,19 
  N 292 306 
  Std. Deviation 2,475 2,439 
Total Mean 6,19 4,95 
  N 3014 2220 
  Std. Deviation 2,398 2,692 
Table A. 32: Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants * Born  
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 7,757 1 7,757 1,349 0,246 
Within groups 17320,31 3012 5,75     
Total 17328,066 3013       
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 542,949 1 542,949 77,519 0 
Within groups 15535,084 2218 7,004     
Total 16078,034 2219       
 
Table A. 33: Religiuos beliefs and practices undermined or enriched by immigrants * 
Born  
Born in country Mean N Std. Deviat. Germany United Kingdom 
Yes Mean 5,2 4,2 
  N 2663 1855 
  Std. Deviation 2,056 2,242 
No Mean 5,39 5,64 
  N 282 298 
  Std. Deviation 2,181 2,218 
Total Mean 5,22 4,4 




  Std. Deviation 2,068 2,292 
Table A. 34: Religiuos beliefs and practices undermined or enriched by immigrants * 
Born 
Germany Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 8,838 1 8,838 2,067 0,151 
Within groups 12585,372 1 4,276     
Total 12594,209 2944       
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 530,31 1 530,31 105,84 0 
Within groups 10777,554 2151 5,01     
Total 11307,864 2152       
Table A. 35: Social threats 
 
Contact with out-group members * Age 
Table A. 36: Contact with different ethnic group: how bad or good * Age 
Age Mean N Std. Deviation Germany United Kingdom 
1 - 18 years Mean 6,39 7,36 
  N 104 45 
  Std. Deviation 2,17 1,909 
18 - 31 years Mean 6,81 7,24 
  N 452 286 
  Std. Deviation 1,986 2,226 
31 - 45 years Mean 6,78 7,22 
  N 583 522 
  Std. Deviation 1,972 1,909 
46 - 60 years Mean 6,85 7,08 
  N 848 540 
  Std. Deviation 7,868 1,978 
61 + years Mean 6,57 7,04 
  N 771 699 
  Std. Deviation 2,132 1,872 
Total Mean 6,73 7,13 
  N 2758 2092 
Country Mean  N Std. Deviation 
Germany 5,34 3011 2,27 




  Std. Deviation 2 1,977 
 
Table A. 37: Contact with different ethnic group: how bad or good * Age 
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 47,529 4 11,882 2,979 0,018 
Within groups 10980,993 2753 3,989     
Total 11028,522 2757       
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 16,564 4 4,141 4,06 0,375 
Within groups 8155,746 2087 3,908     
Total 8172,411 2091       
 
 
Table A. 38: People of minority race/ethnic group in current living area * Age  
GERMANY Value df Asymptotic Significance (2 Sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 49,158 8 0 
Likelihood Ratio 47,945 8 0 
Linear-by-Linear Association 28,035 1 0 
N of Valid Cases 3020     
UK Value df Asymptotic Significance (2 Sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 85,439 8 0 
Likelihood Ratio 86,428 8 0 
Linear-by-Linear Association 69,876 1 0 
N of Valid Cases 2236     
 
 
Table A. 39: Different race or ethnic group: contact, how often * Age 
GERMANY Value df Asymptotic Significance (2 Sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 448,682 24 0 
Likelihood Ratio 465,532 24 0 
Linear-by-Linear Association 347,089 1 0 
N of Valid Cases 3027     
UK Value df Asymptotic Significance (2 Sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 298,79 24 0 
Likelihood Ratio 312,389 24 0 
Linear-by-Linear Association 204,168 1 0 





Table A. 40: Different race or ethnic group: have any close friends * Age 
GERMANY Value df Asymptotic Significance (2 Sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 245,542 8 0 
Likelihood Ratio 250,246 8 0 
Linear-by-Linear Association 216,166 1 0 
N of Valid Cases 3028     
UK Value df Asymptotic Significance (2 Sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 130,115 8 0 
Likelihood Ratio 130,556 8 0 
Linear-by-Linear Association 86,531 1 0 
N of Valid Cases 2239     
Contact with Immigrants * Education  
 
Table A. 41: Contact with different ethnic group: how bad or good * Education 
 
Education Mean N Std. Deviation Germany United Kingdom 
1 Low Mean 6,63 6,88 
  N 54 408 
  Std. Deviation 2,301 2,021 
2 Low Mean 6,41 6,97 
  N 266 284 
  Std. Deviation 2,128 1,968 
3 Medium Mean 6,62 6,96 
  N 1173 71 
  Std. Deviation 2,086 2,004 
4 Medium Mean 6,89 7,2 
  N 237 281 
  Std. Deviation 1,785 1,953 
5 High Mean 6,7 7,52 
  N 326 611 
  Std. Deviation 1,916 1,809 
6 High Mean 7 7,52 
  N 709 611 
  Std. Deviation 1,866 1,809 
Total Mean 6,73 7,13 
  N 2765 2109 




Table A. 42: Contact with different ethnic group: how bad or good * Education 
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 101,241 5 20,248 5,083 0 
Within groups 10991,324 2759 3,984     
Total 11092,564 2764       
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 159,741 5 31,948 8,278 0 
Within groups 8115,961 2103 3,859     
Total 8275,702 2108       
 
Table A. 43: People of minority race/ethnic group in current living area * Education 
GERMANY Value df Asymptotic Significance (2 Sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 36,848 10 0 
Likelihood Ratio 36,921 10 0 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0,275   0,6 
N of Valid Cases 3031     
UK Value df Asymptotic Significance (2 Sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 20,929 10 0,022 
Likelihood Ratio 20,983 10 0,21 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0,972   0,324 
N of Valid Cases 2257     
 
Table A. 44: Different race or ethnic group: contact, how often * Education 
GERMANY Value df Asymptotic Significance (2 Sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 78,173 30 0 
Likelihood Ratio 80,795 30 0 
Linear-by-Linear Association 9,689 1   
N of Valid Cases 3038     
UK Value df Asymptotic Significance (2 Sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 167,98 30 0 
Likelihood Ratio 147,586 30 0 
Linear-by-Linear Association 67,084 1   





Table A. 45: Different race or ethnic group: have any close friends * Education 
GERMANY Value df Asymptotic Significance (2 Sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 83,32 10 0 
Likelihood Ratio 82,956 10 0 
Linear-by-Linear Association 33,535 1 0 
N of Valid Cases 3038     
UK Value df Asymptotic Significance (2 Sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 122,656 10 0 
Likelihood Ratio 123,71 10 0 
Linear-by-Linear Association 112,558 1 0 
N of Valid Cases 2260     
Contact with Immigrants * Born in country 
Table A. 46: Contact with different ethnic group: how bad or good * Born in country 
Germany Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 18,076 1 18,076 4,510 0,034 
Within groups 11074,489 2763 4,008     
Total 11092,564 2764       
United Kingdom Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 
(Combined) 69,449 1 69,449 17,831 0 
Within groups 8206,243 2107 3,895   
Total 8275,702 2018    
Table A. 47: Different race or ethnic group have any close friends * Born in country 
GERMANY Value df Asymptotic Significance (2 Sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 119,671 2 0 
Likelihood Ratio 99,230 2 0 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 101,756 1 0 
N of Valid Cases 3038   
UK Value df Asymptotic Significance (2 Sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 109,755 2 0 
Likelihood Ratio 102,240 2 0 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 104,088 1 0 
N of Valid Cases 2260   
 
